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Philosophy is sometimes accused of being the only
discipline within which progress is never made, and that
accusation is lent what plausibility it has by the fact that
philosophers are, to a significant extent, embroiled in the
same general debates that occupied their predecessors one or
two millennia ago, no one having yet come up with the
definitive word on most of them. There are, however, except-
ions, and Alvin Plantinga is largely responsible for one of
the most recent.
The issue m question is the argument from evil versus
the free will defense. Although interest in this issue has
intensified during the last two decades, efforts from both
sides ( Plantinga
' s excluded) during that time have, it is
argued, been inadequate.
Against that bacKground, Plantinga* s most recent free
will defense is examined and criticized. In the course of
that examination a number of issues concerning subjunctive
conditionals, possible world semantics, modality, world
vii
theory interpretations of the concept of choice, and the
notion of justification are confronted and discussed.
The conclusion argued for is that although there are
features of Plantings' s own defense which might be contro-
versial, a modified Plantigarian free will defense can be
formulated which not only incorporates none of those
features, but which for the first time offers the defender
adequate responses to some particular forms of the argument
from evil, and which also permits the theist to concede the
existence of unjustified evil, yet still successfully to
maintain his theistic position.
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INTRODU ction
Philosophers and non-philosophers alike have long per-
ceived a certain tension between the claims that Sod exists
and that evil exists, and this tension has been the basis for
* Varlety ° f arsUmen'ts evil, the structure of the argu-
ments being a function of the arguers' view of the nature of
that tension - whether it be logical, probabilistic, epietem-
ological, or illusory.
Arrayed against those who think that some form of the
argument from evil tells decisively against the existence of
3od are the proponents of a variety of theodicies and defenses,
who advance a battery of considerations designed to show that
the existence of evil does not close the question of Sod's
existence
.
Any discussion which attempted to deal with ail the
currents of the debate would of necessity be either monumental
or cursory, so the present discussion has been arbitrarily
limited to philosophical arguments attempting to establish
logical inconsistency in the claim that both God and moral
evils exist, on the one hand, and to the free will defenses
on the other.
The first chapter contains a survey of the major arguments
from evil presented during the past two decades, as well as
the main lines of criticism which have been developed against
Xthoae arguments. Although some of the counter
-arguments are
seen to be inadequate for showing difficulties in the argu-
ments from evil, it is argued that all the evil^rguments do
fail in virtue either of incorporating an unacceptable view
of omnipotence, of neglecting to take account of the concept
of justification, or of various formal shortcomings. It is
argued (after Plantings) that the most that can be required
of an omnipotent being is the ability to bring about anything
such that it is consistent that that being bring it about.
Many of the arguments from evil, however, contain demands
that omnipotence imply the ability to bring about any logic-
ally possible situation whatever, which demand cannot, in
view of the foregoing, be supported. Also contained in the
first chapter is a discussion of the notion of justification
as it might apply to God. In general, if an evil is justified,
the relevant agent cannot be accused of lack of goodness
simply in virtue of allowing such an evil to exist. Arguments
designed to show that this notion is inapplicable to God do
not hold up, and if such justification is even logically
possible, many arguments from evil fail.
The second chapter commences with a statement of a
representative free will defense, and the major types of attack
upon it are examined. The defense is, loosely, that God might
have had reasons for allowing evil which are tied up with the
xi
value of human free will and
(and with the view (admitted
freely generated moral goods
at least for argument by most
of those on both sides of the Issue) that free choices can-
not be causally determined by anyone - God included). The
Mjor lines of attack upon this sort of defense are (i) that
It is inconsistent with theism, and (ii) that the defense is
simply inadequate. None of the first type turn out to be
unanswerable, and the arguments attempting to show the
second trip almost en masse over complexities involved in
application of the omnipotence principle set up in the first
chapter.
There is, however, a difficulty for the theist. J. L.
Mackie once suggested that the free will defense could not
be viable because God could simply temporarily remove an
agent’s freedom when He foresaw that otherwise the agent
would commit evil, and otherwise leave the agent free. The
standard theist reply is that God's following that policy
would constitute the complete removal of freedom in any
meaningful sense. At the end of Chapter II it is argued that
the theists' reply is defective, and that the objection can-
not be so lightly tossed off.
The third chapter is devoted to discussion of Plantings *s
most recent free will defense. The first part of the chapter
consists of a non-critical recapitulation of Plantings'
s
arguments and Intuitions. The basic intuitions are first
that since Sod cannot determine people to freely do right,
and since He does value human freedom, all He can do is
create free people and then let them do their own thing,
and second, that it. is logically possible that with respect
to each possible person, were Sod to create that person,
that person would perform evil. Were that possibility
actual. Sod would be unable to create a free world devoid
of evil yet populated by free persons, even though He was
omnipotent.
There are to date only two sorts of criticisms in
print. One is that the defense is inadequate in that it
still allows us to demand that God have created onxy moral
instantiations of all these obstreperous persons. It is
argued in a slightly different context in the second chapter
that that sort of objection is ill-founded. The second is
that while on Plantinga's view God can be unlucky, that can-
not be a divine trait. It is argued that this objection is
somewhat misdirected relative to present purposes.
In Chapter IV, a much closer look is taken at Plantinga'
position, and it is argued that his views on, uses of, and
arguments about subjunctive conditionals similar to
Were God to create S, S would do evil
have certain undesirable features which make his defense
xiii
weaker than it need be. In particular, although many phil-
osophers hold that on the orderings which are central to
most world
-analyses of subjunctives, worlds can tie in
similarity, Plantings does not allow that. It is also often
denied that for any. two true propositions A and B, it is
true that were A the case then B would be. Plantings 's
arguments presuppose that that is true. It is also argued
that a principle which Plantings employs concerning the
notion of ability is defective. Also discussed are a
number of issues which arise concerning various mixtures of
worlds, the concept of choice, and modality.
An informal reconstruction of the Plantingarian defense
is then suggested. It is argued that the modified defense
is both adequate and free from the questioned features of
Plantings' a original defense.
Finally, in Chapter V a more formal version of the
suggestion made in Chapter IV is offered. In addition to
making lesser demands on the theist, the modified defense,
it is argued, does more than the traditional defenses, and
more than Plantings 's original defense. It is argued that
for the first time the theist can frame a successful
response to the Mackie objection of Chapter II, and further
that the Plantinga
-style defense offers the theist - again
for the first time — the basis for a defense against which
xiv
even the admission of the existence of unjustified evil (on
the usual view of 'unjustified') is not fatal.
1CHAPTER I
Although disputation concerning aod and evil has been
going on for a number of centuries, there is still such a lack;
of agreement over what the flies has been about that it has now
become almost a commonplace that there is no one problem of
evil, but a number of distinct problems. It has been claimed
by some that
(1) There is an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly
good aod *
and (2) There is evil
are logically incompatible and that that incompatibility con-
stitutes a problem - at least for the theist. others have
granted the consistency of (1) and (2) but have seen (2) as
strong evidence against (1), and have formulated anti-theistic
arguments around that, still others have denied that the prob-
lem has any logical dimension at all, asserting that it is
rather a purely human problem of reconciliation - of resisting,
in the face of evil, the advice of Job's friends to curse God
and die*
The first charge is of basic importance in an obvious way:
if (1) and (2) are jointly inconsistent, then the remaining
issues quickly become trivial. In view of the fact that after
something of a lull the last two decades have seen a new bar-
rage of arguments designed to establish inconsistency, it would
be premature to cons id er any of the other
examining the first.
questions without
2
The current round In the dispute was opened by J.L .
Mackie OJ in 1955. Hankie asserted that 'several parts of
essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one
another' and the parts in question turned out to be ( 1 ) and ( 2 ).
The contradiction, Mackie admitted, did not 'arise immediately'
from ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) but could be explicitly brought out by the
addition of a number of 'quasi-logical' rules, of which Mackie
gave two as follows:
(5) Good is opposed to evil in such a way that a goodthing always eliminates evil as far as it can
and (4) There are no limits to what an omnipotent thine
can do. &
Mackie continued: 'From these it follows that a good omnipotent
being eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions
that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are
incompatible' •
Mackie evidently viewed (J) and ( 4 ) as obvious enough to
make arguments for them superfluous, and others who maintained
the inconsistency of (1) and ( 2 ) - e.g., H. J. Mcoloskey [llj -
apparently did not feel that (J) and ( 4 ) merited even the pass-
ing mention that Mackie had accorded them.
Nevertheless, the truth of ( 5 ) and (4) was not clear to
everyone. Most philosophers accept the view that even omnip-
otent beings are subject to the strictures of logic, and thus
5(A) must be read to mean that there are no non-logical limits
to what an omnipotent thing can do. It is perhaps initially
tempting to try to accomodate that adjustment to (A) (relativ-
ized to God ) in the following manner:
(4a)
l*
U is P° S8ible that S, then God can make itthe case that S
But (Aa) has not gone unchallenged. The first suggestion
of dissatisfaction seems to have come from S. A. Grave [A]
,
although Alvin Plantings fl 7] first explicitly criticised
something like (Aa). We can adapt a Plantings criticism and
note that while it ia possible that some specific s is the
case but not made so by God, God cannot make it the case that
S is the case but not made so by God.
Plantings then offered the following replacement
If God marces 5 obtain is possible, then God,being omnipotent, can make S obtain
by which he meant that if it is possible that God makes it the
case that S, then God can make it the case that 3
.
(4b)
begins to look likely, but as we will see at a later point,
application of it can present pitfalls for the rambunctious.
But (4b) will serve Mackie for the moment, since there
seems to be nothing contradictory in God's making it the case
that there is no evil. There are any number of ways that the
absence of evil might be guaranteed - for instance, by the
omission of creation. Presumably, if (5) i 8 true, then God
would makte that guarantee, although hopefully by other than
the indicated means.
4But 18 ( 5 ) acceptable? Before attempting an answer, we
Kust see that (?) Is not unequivocal. (J) could be construed
as either
(5*) Good is opposed to evil in such
thing always brings about the b
uation it can
a way that a good
98
1
overall sit-
or ( 5b) Good is opposed to evil
thing always eliminates
in such a way that a good
every evil it can
and the general direction of any particular argument from evil
will depend in part upon which of the above is employed.
In order to generate a contradiction using either ( 5a) or
(5b), at least one further premise is needed. If ( 5a) is the
route of choice, then it must be held that
(Ac) The best situation God can bring about is freefrom evil
and ( 5b) can be used effectively only in conjunction with
something like
(^ ) uod can eliminate every evil
Of course, if ( 1 ) and (2) are to be shown inconsistent in
virtue of either ( 3a) and (4c) or ( 5b) and (4d), both of which-
ever pair is employed must be necessary, or follow from ( 1 ) and
(2). Although there are some exceptions which will be discussed
later, there is little unhappiness even among theists with ( 3a)
and (4d )
.
Dissent arises, however, over ( 3b) and (4c). The
case against the necessity of (4c) can be most clearly made out
in connection with free will defenses, so discussion concerning
5it will be deferred, and present discussion will center on ( 5b)
As a matter of fact, (Jb) seems to be the reading of (?)
that most of those who have propounded arguments from evil
(following Plantings, the term
' atheologian' will be used to
refer to them) have had in mind. The evidence (which is more
or less circumstantial, since many atheologians have stated
their premises even less precisely than Mackie's (5) and ( 4 ))
is first, that although a number of atheologians have explic-
itly appealed to or argued for (Ad), no such attention has
been turned upon ( 4 c) within the context of an atheological
argument, and second, that theiets have repeatedly attacked
( 5b), and atheologians have just as repeatedly taken such
attacks as assaults on their position, instead of pointing out,
as would be natural were (5a) the employed principle, that
such attacks were wide of the mark. Others have flatly admit-
ted the non-necessity of (5b) and then have given up inconsis-
tency claims. More direct evidence is provided by the fact
that there has been at least one attempt to argue for a variant
of (5b). That attempt will be discussed shortly.
Criticisms of (5b) are widespread, and generally follow a
pattern. The backing intuition of the attacks is that surely
a being would not be held censurable for refraining from pre-
venting some evil if that prevention entailed the non-real-
ization of some good that was sufficiently greater than that
6attainable in the faoe of the prevention (or destruction or
absence) of that evil, if any such evil my be called a
justified evil, then the claim could be made that a being
could retain the title 'good' despite not frustrating evil ao
long as the evil involved is justified. Thus with respect to
a justified evil, (Jb) might be false just because (}a) is true
We should note that one person 3 might not be censurable
for permitting or bringing about some evil e, even though some
other person 3' might be. For instance, if 3 were a surgeon
and s' not, there are oases in which 3 could without acquiring
moral reprehensibility inflict pain of surgery, but s' could
not. Thus when the notion of justification is introduced
into a context where moral worth is being assessed, that
notion of justification must be relativized to the relevant
agent's powers, skills, etc.
The case in which we are interested is that of God - an
omnipotent, omniscient being - so from here on it will be
assumed that God is the relevant agent in any discussion of
justification. Of course, given that God is omnipotent and
omniscient, it might be objected that this justification
escape-clause is not applicable to Him. To that, Nelson
Pike [l5] responds
As a general statement, a being who permits (or
brings about) an instance of suffering might be
perfectly good providing only that there is a
7morally sufficient reason for his action. Thus itdoes not follow from the claim that God is perfectlygood that He would prevent suffering if He could
7
God might fail to prevent suffering^ or Hims^fbring about suffering while remaining perfectly goodIt is required only that there be a moral y sufffcie^treason for His action. a inci n
PiKe sees the issue revolving about the logical status of
(5) An omnipotent and omniscient being would have no
morally sufficient reason for allowing [evTlf
If such a morally sufficient reason for an evil is a justifica-
tion of that evil, then if P i ke is right if it is possible that
evils be justified then (Jb) is not necessarily true.
Thus unless ( 5 ) is necessary, (Jb) is not. Why should the
necessity matter? As Plantinga points out, those who attempt
to show that (1) and (2) are inconsistent must do so using
only (1), (2), and whatever necessary propositions are
relevant. The relevance of (Jb) is inarguable, but if
(6 ) o( evil is justified)
then the necessity of (Jb) is lost. We could, of course,
modify (5) further to
( 5 C ) A good thing always eliminates unjustified evil
as far as it can
but in the absence of a case for the existence of unjustified
evil, the a theological usefulness of (Jc) is unclear - even
were it granted necessity*
tjiven that if (6) is true (Jb) is not necessary, various
moves are available to the atheologian. Some have admitted (6)
and, having seen Its implications for (Jb), have abandoned the
inconsistency claim. For instance, Edward H. Madden and Peter
H. Hare (e.g., [loj ) believe that
• • • claiming that 'there is no morally sufficientreason for an almighty God to allow any'instan« ofevil is necessarily true
. . . would be absurd.
while Antony Flew [5] maintains that
V • the evils of the world can perhaps ... beshown to have been one and all, in fact the logic-
goods?
e0eSSary 00ndiUon8 of realized higher-order
Allowing for varying interpretations of 'justified', both
of the above seem to be admissions of (6). Madden, Hare, and
Flew further hold, however, that the claim that all actual evi
is justified is 'extremely implausible' and develop various
arguments from there, of course, in these cases the ground
rules have been changed in that (2) is no longer the crucial
accusation, so their further arguments will not be explored he:
The loyal atheological adherent to (}b) can follow either
of two main strategies. He can claim that (Jb) is contingent
but follows from (1) and (2), or he can hold out for the
necessity of (Jb) despite the foregoing. Mo one, it seems, has
attempted the former. Given that Mackie, at least, seems to
have held (Jb) to be 'quasi-logical
' ,
that is not surprising.
Additionally, the prospects of deriving (Jb) from (1) and (2)
if (5b) is contingent look bleak.
9The a theologian who holds that (Jb) is necessary has
three options: (i) he can try to show that (6) is false,
thereby saving his position from the challenge of the moment,
(ii) he can try to establish the necessity of (Jb) directly,
or (iii) he can admit (6) true and still claim that he can
use (Jb) to show that (1) and (2) are inconsistent.
The last option does not look promising, oddly enough,
it is one of the more popular. For instance, McCloskey [ll]
responds to a proposed defense against the charge that (1) and
(2) are inconsistent by saying
thit'itl
8eri°U
! ?
ef90t in the [Pro P°9 ®d defense isa I j can at best show that moral evil may have
a justification. -=k
But of course, if the defender has shown that much, he has
shown Kackie's original argument deficient, and McCloskey
explicitly embraces that argument, what McCloskey cites as
a defect seems to be that it can do no more than it needs to
do in order to refute his position.
Attempts along line (ii) are a bit sparse. There are
people willing to assert that (Jb) is necessary, but although
there is, as mentioned earlier, one attempt to present an
argument, it seems to be the only one. It comes from R. D.
Bradley [l]
,
who also asserts the analyticity of something like
(5b). Bradley propounds a variant argument from evil employing
as a premise
10
( 7 ) If God is willing that evil exist,
perfectly good.
then He is not
Although never made explicit, it is clear from his comments
that he is using 'willing' in such a way that Sod is willing
that evil exist just in case it is false that He would prevent
all evil if He could.- In support of (7) Bradley argues
Since there is presumably no contradiction in the
supposition that there should exist a God who is notWilling that evil should exist, and such a logical?!possible aod would seem on any ordinary criteria to*be morally superior to a God who is willing that
evil should exist, it follows that"the latter sortof uod cannot, without conceptual inconsistency, bedescribed as wholly or perfectly good.
But any God who would eliminate all the evil He could might
well find Himself also lowering the net amount of good in the
world were the evils in question justified evils, and in that
case it seems that there are 'ordinary criteria' which do not
dictate that the refraining being be held morally inferior.
Thus if Bradley is going to appeal to ordinary criteria, he must
show that those criteria dealing with the permitting of justified
evils are somehow defective, irrelevant to God, or irrelevant
to his argument. He does none of these.
His argument also leans heavily on the following sort of
inference
:
(6) A is superior to B
thus (9) b is not perfectly good
The legitimacy of that is not clear. It is widely held that
11
there is no beat possible world, i e
(i°) ^or any world w
» there is some world w' such
t-nat w is superior to w
For all that, it may be perfectly all right to hold that there
are worlds - infinitely many of them, in fact - that deserve
to be called perfect
-worlds
.
The atheologians who opted to retain the view that (1) and
(2) were inconsistent, and who took either of the second or
third of the options sketched earlier, were under no particular
compulsion to come seriously to grips with the notion of
justification and its theistic employment. The attacker taking
the first suggested route was under rather more of an obligation
to do so. In fact, there have been a number of attempts to
explicate what 'justification' means relative to God, and trys
have come from both sides of the issue. An early characteriza-
tion mentioned previously was one by pike to the effect that
d l i 0 justilied just in case there is a
morally sufficient reason for it
That may be very close to correct, but what it ie that makes
something a morally sufficient reason is left unspecified, and
J
1
is of little help in getting a line on the truth value of
(6) and, as Plantinga, Pike, and Dewey J. Hoitenga [dj variously
point out, that is where one major issue in the battle will
ultimately be settled.
12
Plantings gave a somewhat more detailed early notion of
justification. In hia [l6] we find:
J2 • • . an evil state of affairs is justified just
xn case it is false that for every good that
entails it, there is a greater good that does not.
In short, an evil is justified if and only if there is some
good that entails it, and every good greater than that good
likewise entails it.
That sort of view was spelled out a bit more liilly yet
by Hoitenga who claimed that justification involves the
following (taken fairly directly):
(i) the justifying good is dependent upon the
specific justified evil
(ii) the good is obtainable in no way which
excludes the evil
(iii) the good outweighs the evil
(iv) the good outweighs any alternative good
achievable by non
-evil means
The theist had been happy with the view that if justifi-
cation was possible, then God could permit evil, but Hoitenga
set out to demonstrate that the stakes were a bit higher - that
if evil was justifiable and God existed, then there just had to
be evil. He says
For the justification of the evil that exists is
made in terms both of an assertion that some good
depends on it, and a denial that any higher good
not depending upon it is available instead. For
if evil may be justified, then, if God exists and
evil exists, it is justified; ... if evil is
15
justified, then it is also necessary, for it is thenecessary condition for the good whlih, since Godall good, is therefore willed by Him. Given Hisgoodness, together with His omniscience and omnip-otence, evil ie inevitable. ^
Exactly what is meant by 'inevitable' is not spelled out,
usua 1 ly by p rnaK.es inevitable Q' is meant that 'if p then
Q' has some sort of necessity attaching to it. Just what the
antecedent should be in this case (that there is evil i 8> of
course, the consequent) is not clear. What is initially
assumed is that justification is possible, that God exists,
and that there is evil. That does indeed imply that there is
evil, and with whatever sort of necessity is desired, but
that can hardly be what Hoitenga wants. Equally trivial is
that if the evil that exists is justified, then there is
evil, so perhaps what Hoitenga is arguing here is that if evil
can be justified, and if God exists, then evil exists. The
argument might be filled out this way; consider a world w
containing some evil e, and a set S of morally alternative
worlds to w, determined by whatever definition of 'alternative'
is intended for condition (iv) above. Let us grant that we
can consider each world in S to have associated with it some
unique relative goodness quotient. The resultant ranging
of the worlds in S will be a necessary one, and if it is the
case that for every world w' in 3, if w' is better than w
then w' also contains e, then it will necessarily so be the
14
case, and (according to 35) if it ia oven possibia it i= neces-
aary. Aaauma that it ia poaaibla. Than thara ia aoma e-contain-
mg world such that avary non-e-containing world in s is infer-
ior to it. God - if He ia all good and omnipotent - will
eschew creating an a-free world, and will create some e-contain-
ing world, if He does so, there will, 0 f course, be evil.
'f it is merely possible that evil be justified and if God
exists
,
then there is evil.
The c nclusion is rather unexpected, amounting as it does
to a claim that (!) and (6) entail (2) - that if justification
ia even possible, then God does not exist unless there ia evil.
A theist might not find that disturbing, but I do not feel
that that conclusion is one that anyone can be compelled to
accept. Admitted, if Sod does create a member of s, and if He
can pick any member of s He wants to create, then He should
undoubtedly opt for one of the e-„orlds. But wny thin* that
He has to pick from s, that it is necessary that He do so?
Ia it possible that there are sets of alternatives to other
evils having structures different from 3 - ones in which the
top worlds are non-evil? if a0
,
then if God created from one
of them, He would maintain His goodness even if He created a
non-evil world, it thus being not true - much lees inevitable -
that there is evil even though God exists and (since s has the
structure it does) it is possible that evil be justified. Thus
15
uni ess every poasible world is held to be a moral alternative
to every other world for God, or unless it is held that every
other poasible aet of alternatives has an S-like structure,
the argument faila. But there seems absolutely no reason to
hold the latter, and at a later point an argument concluding
m effect that even in an omnipotent being's case not every
world is a reachable alternative, will be considered.
The point can be put in a slightly different way. As
pointed out earlier, if justification is to have any bearing
on judgements of the moral worth of an individual, the
involved notion of justification must allow for considerations
of the agent's powers, knowledge, alternatives, etc.
However, the present characterization of justification is a
purely logical one, containing no restrictions on what worlds
figure into determinations that some evil is or is not
justified. That amounts to a presupposition that every world
counts as an alternative for God, i.e., that God can create
any world He pleases. But that is a bit too close to the
discredited (4a). In order for any reliable judgement of
uod a goodness to come out of any argument involving a char-
acterization of justification, some restriction is going to
have to be placed upon worlds admitted as alternatives, i.e.,
the omnipotence presupposition is going to have to be tailored
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to conform to (4b).
There is also a more immediate response that can be made
and that is that the incorporated notion of justification is
incorrect. For instance, (i) and (ii) on Hoitenga's list
require that the justified evil be a necessary condition of
the justifying good. Although this requirement is commonly
found in analyses of justification - another related instance
is Roderick Chisholm's
[2 ] - that began to appear to some
to be too strong a requirement for reasons which can be
extracted from Plantinga's gloss of the standard free will
d efense s
A world containing creatures who are sometimes
significantly free is more valuable, all else being
equal, than a world containing no free creatures
at all. Now God can create free creatures, but
He cannot cause or determine them to do only what
is right. For if He does so, then they are not
significantly free after all; they do not do
what is right freely
. To create creatures capable
of moral good
,
therefore, He must create creatures
capable of moral evil; and He cannot leave these
creatures free to perform evil and at the same
time prevent them from doing so. ... Thus He
could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil
only by excising the posibility of moral good.
[18] p. 166-7
The above will get close examination later, but for the moment
the important point Plantinga makes is that a certain amount
of evil may be justified by considerations of freedom (and
freely performed good); however, Plantinga does not believe
that freedom entails that there is evil. It only guarantees
17
the possibility of it.
In support of his position, Hoitenga had said
If the existenoa of evil is not an unconditional
rsieot^his°
r
it
n arbU
r
ry accent (theists wouldeject th , seems to me, with equal vi£0 r^ it
must be a conditioned necessity.
& ’
The claim is that if evil is not held to be necessary, the
tbeist can cite justification only if the justifying good
requires the existence of evil. In concluding that, Hoitenga
rejects the 'arbitrary accident' option out of hand. We are
not told what an arbitrary accident is, but if that and
necessity and conditioned necessity are to be exhaustive and
mutually exclusive, presumably evil is an arbitrary accident
just in case it exists, that it does so is contingent, and no
justifying good entails that it does. If so, Hoitenga has
underestimated the theist, since Plantings plans to drive his
defense right through the arbitrary accident gap.
The emerging view of justification was also pushed by
Grave, ^ who sayss
1 Grave makes the writing of an orderly history of the problem of
evil and the free will defense difficult by being consistently oneto two decades ahead of his time. However, his views seem to have
attracted relatively little notice, and his [4] is referenced inthe literature perhaps only four or five times, and sometimes
even then for marginal reasons. That may be because his views
are rather tersely and compactly stated, and their full sweep
can for the first time be easily seen in the light of Plantinga's
recent arguments.
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J
5 - ie point of the theiat'a reply is that moral
are not necessary, but necessarily possible,
quences [of the justifying good).
evils
conse-
It was a view akin to this that was adopted by Richard R.
LaOroix [7] in an attempt to show that one could successfully
employ the first of the a theologian' s three options. LaQroix
set out to show that it is necessarily the case that all evil
is unjustified, and gave this rendering of justification:
J4 An evil e is justified iff preventing e entails
preventing the possibility of moral good which
outweighs it.
However, does not seem quite right either. The
'preventing the possibility' locution is a bit misleading.
Logical possibilities cannot, as such, be prevented (although
their actualizations often can be) so the intent must be
closer to
J4 An evil e is justified i f
f
preventing e entails
preventing the realization of some necessary
condition of each alternative moral good which
outweighs it.
But J4' is still defective. It might be that the neces-
sary condition of some justifying good was a disjunction of
evils, all equally bad* If any one of them were actual, the
condition would be met and that evil justified. But we could
prevent that evil without preventing the good, by merely
allowing one of the other evils in the disjunction to exist.
However, we can perhaps let that go by and see if the argument
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by Lacroix is promising enough in other respects to warrent
further refinement of J4 .
The argument comes down to this (all premises are
directly quoted )
;
( 11 ) Joa exis ts (and created everything ex nihilo and
in time)
Thus (12) If jod had not created, there would be nothin?
but God &
(15) God is the greatest possible good
Thus (14) If aod had not created, there would be nothing
but the greatest possible good
(15) The greatest possible good is moral good which
outweighs any possible evil
Thus (16) If jod had not created, there would be nothing
but moral good which outweighs any possible evil
(17) If God had not created, there would be no evil
(18) God need not have created
Thus (19) God could prevent evil by not creating
Thus (20) God could prevent evil without preventing the
realization of some necessary condition of every
moral good which outweighs any possible evil
Thus (21) Every evil is such that preventing it does not
entail preventing the realization of some neces-
sary condition of every moral good which outweighs
it
Thus (22) If there is evil, then preventing it does not entail
preventing the realization of some necessary
condition of every moral good which outweighs it
Thus ( 25 ) If there is evil, then it is unjustified
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Notice first that the 'is' in (15) allows (15) to be
read in more than one way. For instance, we might interpret
it aa
(I5a
) God is the (morally) best possible being
°r (ljb) God = the greatest possible good
It looks, since (12) and (lj) are supposed to imply (Ik),
as though ( 15 b) is Lacroix' intent, but I think that no
reasonable theist holds (l5b), and it certainly does not
follow from ( 1 ), for although a being may be good, claiming
that a good may turn out to be a being does not seem correct.
Since no problem arises for the theist unless the premises
are either theologically essential or necessary, and since
(IJb) seems neither, we can assume that (l^a) is actually
the desired reading. Many would object to both (1>) and
( 15b) on the grounds that the notions of a best possible
being or a greatest possible good, litce that of a greatest
possible number, are suspect, but that can perhaps be put
aside for the moment.
If (lja) is intended, then (14) becomes
(14a) If God had not created, there would be nothing
but the best possible being
Since (16) is to come from (14a) and (15), (15) must also
be modified :
21
(15a) If nothing exists but the best possible being,then there exists moral good which outweighs
any possible evil °
But (15a) seems also neither theiatioally nor logically neces
sary.
Overall, the argument in its present form does not seem
to establish ( 25 ).
If there was any conclusion to be drawn up to this point
it was that the atheologians had not been very successful in
carrying through their various chosen tasks. There were a
number of people who thought that they knew why - that on
rather general grounds it could be shown that the atheologians
could not possibly make their case. Cne such was William E.
McMahon [15] who held that the anti-theistic arguments all
hinged on the intelligibility of the notion of a better
possible world than this one, and denied that the notion
was in fact intelligible. G. Schlesinger |j>l] made a some-
what related attempt to show that no matter what sort of
world God chose to create, the mere existence of evil could
never count against Him. The argument:
(24) There is no (logical) limit to the amount of
good possible
(25) If there is no such limit, then it is not
possible to create that world having the greatest
amount of good
Therefore
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(26) Ood cannot create that world having the moat good
Thus (27) Sod cannot create a acrid having no evil
might ask: why not create a better world than
this one though? The reply seems to be that that question is
pointless, since no matter what world Cod created, the same
could be asked of it. Thus
(28) Sod is not to be blamed solely because He
created a world which has evil
Schlesinger concludes that 'the mere fact' of the
presence of evil 'points to nothing'. In this conclusion he
is backed by e.g., James Ross [20] and Charles Hartshorns
[5] .
However, it is not clear that Schlesinger has made hie
case. Although we can permit him the move from (27) to (28),
that from (26) to ( 27 ) seems to require a premise to the effect
that
(29) The absence of any (some) possible good is itself
an evil
Evidently, (29) has been supported by a number of philosophers.
Even some atheologians have come close to it. For instance,
KcCloskey
[12] without specifying exactly what he means by
'appropriate' says 'Absence of an appropriate good is itself
evil', it would be odd, however, to find a supporter of the
argument from evil accepting (29), since given the incompatibility
of some goods - eg Jones' suffering in an inspirationally
noble manner, and Jones' never suffering
- (29) implies that it
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is necessary that there is evil, and given that, (2) would
not count against much of anything. Moreover, the necessity
of evil would falsify (Ad) forcing the atheologian to give
up that, route entirely.
And (29) has another consequence
- one that has an odd
ring to it. If we grant that there are some justifying goods
which entail evils, then the absence of those eviis entails
the absence of those particular goods. Thus not only is the
absence of a good an evil, but the absence of some evils is
an evil.
Finally, (29) haa been flatly denied by some philosophers.
For instance, Chisholm [2] argues that the absence of a good
is not necessarily an evil, but is, rather, a neutraL To
adapt a case-type from Chisholm, the total good in the
Western hemisphere would certainly be increased were it the
case that there was a colony of supremely happy Martian sand
crabs secretly and benignly living beneath the Mojave Desert.
But were we to catalog the ills of this hemisphere, the
absence of such a colony wouldn't make the list.
Schlesmger 1 a argument does not work without something
like (29), but at the very least we lack a case for it.
Nicholas La Para [8] did not exactly see how the
impossibility of a best possible world licensed God to create an
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evil-containing world, and his argument - though not
presented explicitly - seems to be this:
Let S be the set of all of God's creative
options (worlds).
Define 'a > b' as 'a is better than b'
Define 'Op' as 'it is obligatory that P'
(50) ( x )(y)(x€ 3a y£SA x> y ^ 0^ (God creates y))
That is not entirely unintuitive. If an agent can pick
from a number of options, he is perhaps obliged to not pick
one of the inferior ones.
But there is, remember, no best possible world, ie
(51) (x)(x e 3 —> (3 y)(y e s a y > x))
Therefore
( 52 ) (*)(* e s —> C<nu(God creates x))
jod has, of course, created a member of S if He
created this world, and thus has done something He was, if
(52)
is true, obligated not to do. Thus, the goodness
claim in (1) seems compromised.
The argument is valid, and we can for present purposes
accept (JO). However, a second major and general area of
dispute can now be made out. 3 is stipulated as the set of
all worlds that God can choose to create. Given that there
is no best possible world, does it follow that there is no
best world in S? If every possible world is in S - i.e., if
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God can create any world - then we must admit that 8 has no
beat world. If it l8 not the case that every world is In S,
then we need some Independent argumentation to show that (Jl)
la true. Recall that In arriving at (4b) it was seen that
there were some possible worlds that God, though omnipotent,
could not bring about. The qualification in (4b) at the
time may have seemed innoououe, but it cuts a rather wider
swath than expected, and Plantings will use it in an argu-
ment to be examined later to show that
(55) ( 3 w ) (O (
3
A ) ( God does A> world w is actualized)
ut <^(3A)(God does A > world w is actualized))
(where ' > 1 is the subjunctive connective).
If (55) ie true - and I think it is - then the status
of ( 51 ) is unsettled and the above argument cannot be taken
as establishing anything. ( 31 ) has a certain peculiarity
about it in any case. In the limiting instance where God
creates no contingent creatures, objects, etc., it is still
the case that there is a complete, consistent set of true
propositions. Does that give us a world? It might seem so.
Since God presumably has that option, is that world in S?
Evidently. Since God is, by the argument, obligated to not
bring about any other world, but is not, apparently, obligated
to forestall that empty world, is it, then, the best world
in S? If so, then it looks like La Para's conclusion implies
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the falsity of one of his premises.
We should note that Schlesinger also seems to pre-
suppose that there is no significant limit on the order of
(55) as to what worlds God can create. Although some
might grant him that there is no best possible world, if
there is a best one that God can create, then the fact that
for whatever world God might have created there is a better
possible world comes to be beside the point.
(We can now also see a bit further into the deferred
response to the previously discussed argument by Hoitenga.
If we consider what an agent is able to do instead of some
given option as alternatives to that option, then again,
that every possible world is a creative alternative for God
can be read as that God can create every possible world.
(55) would rather disembowel his argument, since (55) says
that there is at least one world such that there is
nothing such that were God to do it, that world would result.
In view of that, it would appear that God cannot, as a matter
of fact, cause that world to be actual.)
Both La para and Jay F. Rosenberg [19] suspected that
Scnlesinger was not on solid ground for other reasons, and
directed the following sorts of considerations against
Schlesinger: (from Rosenberg)
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[ Let T be a type of world] In wbich Intrinsic evils
revard
e
to
n
tt
“hateVer the state of that worid withg r he preaence or absence of intrinsic soods.
Where 'intrinsic evils' are understood as 'positive disvalues,
not mere privations'.
The argument proceeds
( 3M God ought not create a world of type T
( 35 ) God created a world of type T
Thus (56) God is morally censurable
and if so, (1) i 8 false.
To begin with, it is not clear that this argument con-
fronts Schlesinger at all. His claim was that God, if He is
censurable, is censurable for something beyond the simple
existence of evil. The above argument does not even purport
to dispute that, but is geared rather to showing that God is
culpable for creating a world containing 'intrinsic' evils -
which is consistent with Schlesinger
' s point.
But is Rosenberg's argument theistically damaging in any
case? The argument can be made valid, and (35) seems to be
true - at least, theists would accept it. Most of us can
probably agree that there are worlds that God ought not have
created, given other choices, and that were we to discover that
our world was one of them, a strong anti-theistic case could
be made (although some
- perhaps Hartshorne [5] - would dis-
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agree). Of course, we might want to dispute (54 ) with the
specified T. If evil is justifiable, the case for (54)
needs filling out, since it is not obvious why God ought
to be censured for evils which are justified. Rosenberg
might borrow a line from Hoitenga, and claim that just-
ification - at least in our usual situations - requires
that there already be some given evil, the remedying of
which justifies some further temporary evil as a means.
(For instance, the inflicting of the pain of surgery may
be held justified only if there is already some mal-
function requiring correction.) since there was no evil
prior to creation (ignoring ( 29 ) for the moment) there
would be no need for the introduction of some evil as
part of a remedial program. I am not sure that the
original statement is correct; if the introduction of
evil into some states of affairs can result in a raising
of the level of good, there seems no clear reason for
denying that the same process could work: in cases with a
higher starting point.
In any case, if there is only 3ome significantly
restricted proper subset of possible worlds that God,
though omnipotent, can create, and if every world in that
subset is such that it contains justified evil, or if the
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best world (if any) does, it is again not clear why God
is under the obligation alleged in (j4 ).
The tacit presumption of the absence of any such
significant restriction as (55) would imply has gone
virtually unquestioned except by Plantings (and possibly
Grave [k] - he seems to hint in that direction, but his
remarks are a bit obscure on the point). But if there is
such a restriction, the impact would be enormous, partic-
ularly in conjunction with the post-pike picture of just-
ification. That notion depends up.n a ranking of alter-
native situations (or worlds) by goodness. If there is
some e-containing world above every world in which e is
prevented, the evil is justified. If there is no e-
world so situated, the evil is unjustified. But suppose
that (55) i- 8 true, and that evil e is unjustified. Is it
possible that among the non-crea table worlds are all worlds
above some e-world? Since we do not yet know what it is
that might make a world non-crea table, we can hardly give
a flat 'no 1 . But notice that if that is the case, then
the best world that God can choose is one containing not
only evil, but evil which on these notions of justification
is unjustified. Since that world is the best of those that
God can choose from, He should not, on our usual intuitions.
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be censured for creating it. Thus, for all we know at this
juncture, if there are worlds that God - though omnipotent -
cannot create, then even the existence of unjustified evil
does not tell against His goodness (or existence), and
Plantinga, as mentioned, argues that there are such worlds.
Obviously, we shall have to examine that argument, and will
at a later stage.
(Some might take the above as showing that no one has
pinned down ' justification' and it is easy to be somewhat
sympathetic, since the characterizations, by dealing only
in world rankings, thereby either presuppose that God can
create any possible world - which is false - or else give
us a notion of justification which is applied to God with-
out taking due account of His abilities - which is a
deviation from any normal application of 'justification'
relative to some agent. I think that no one has managed
to formalize what may well be the right intuition - pike's
'having a morally sufficient reason'. Pike's version is also
the only one which explicitly acknowledges that the notion is
ultimately agent-relative.)
In sum, if the justification of evil is possible, then
the charged contradiction between (1) and (2) cannot be
demonstrated using anything like (Jb) - Mackie's first quasi-
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logical rule. If (55) i 8 true, then Mackie's second quasi-
logical rule
- ( 4 ) - is also rendered unuseable, and the
popular presumption that we can pick arbitrary worlds and
blithely claim them to be creative alternatives for God
also has to be jettisoned, since all of the foregoing
a theological arguments rely on at least one or the other of
Mackie's rules, if (6) and (55) are true, they all fall.
In Chapter II, some attempts to show that freedom can
justify evil will be examined, as will the major atheological
responses. In Chapter III, Plantinga's support of (55)
will be scrutinized.
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CHAPTER II
From the literature one gets the impression that the
theist feels an instinctive defensiveness when discussing
the consistency of the existence of God and evil, yet when
discussion shifts to the most popular of what might be
called attempts at constructive proofs of consistency
- the
free will defense - we seem to get a role reversal: the
theist relaxes while the atheologian feels the compulsion
to scramble to Keep hie position intact. In fact, most
theists relax to the point of feeling no need to even say
what the free will defense is. Fortunately, Alvin Plantings
recounts what is probably the view most theists would devel-
one if they made their intentions explicit:
A world containing creatures who freely performboth good and evil actions - and who do more goodthan evil - is more valuable than a world contain-ing quasiautomata who always do what is right be-
cause they are unable to do otherwise. Now God can
create free creatures, but He cannot causally or
otherwise determine them to do only what is right;
or if He does so, then they do not do what is right
freely. To create creatures capable of moral ^ood,
then, He must create creatures capable of moral evil;but He cannot create the possibility of moral evil
and at the same time prohibit its actuality. And as
it turned out, some of the free creatures God created
exercised their freedom to do what is wrong; hence
moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes
err, however, in no way tells against God's omnip-
otence or against His goodness; for He could
forestall the occurrence of moral evil only by re-
moving the possibility of moral good.
p 1^2 Plantinga flU]
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The atheologian, confronted with that, can respond in two
»ays: he can show that essential parts of the defense are
inconsistent with essential parts of theism, or he can try to
uncover errors within the body of the defense itself, and
a imply show it inadequate.
It is obvious that no defense essential parts of which
are inconeistent with claims of Cod's omnipotence, ossiiecience,
or goodness can hold much promise. A number of philosophers
have attacked the free will defense on just that ground -
claiming in particular that if there is either an omnipotent
or an omniscient being, there can be no distinct free beings.
That there can be such beings is, of course, basic to the
free will defense.
J.L. Mackie [8] offers some interesting views along the
first line, including this argument:
. .
. there is a fundamental difficulty in the
notion of an omnipotent God creating men with free
will, for if men's wills are really free this must
mean that even God cannot control them, that is,
God is no longer omnipotent.
Wo might interpret this argument as
(1) Will W is free —> ^0(God controls W)
^ O i controls W) —> rJ (God is omnipotent)
Thus (j) Will W is free —> rJ (God is omnipotent)
If so, it is not convincing. First of all, the employed
notion of omnipotence - that if God is omnipotent He can
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control free wills even though it is not possible, given (1),
that He do so - is a dubious one. If it is not logically
possible that a free will be controlled, then Sod • s inabil-
ity to control one is certainly irrelevant to whether or not
He is omnipotent. In addition, there is a strong likelihood
that (1) is mismodalized. If the term 'free 1 has any
function at all, then presumably there are also unfree wills
which can be controlled. 3o unless it is held that any free
will is necessarily so (and no one has argued that) the
claim must be that it is not possible that a free will be
controlled, but that cashes out as
(^•) Q (Will W is free 3 (God controls W))
rather than (1). In short, if it is logically possible that
wills all be controlled, then (1) seems false; but if it is
not possible that they be controlled, then (2) seems false.
If the consequent of (1) is supposed to be a denial of ability
rather than of logical possibility, then (1) needs further
argument since it now may not follow from some general
principle about wills and omnipotent beings, but is only an
unsupported principle concerning a specific individual - God.
An objection similar to Mackie*s was registered by
Thomas McPherson tn] .
This solution depends, among other things, upon a
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particular understanding of the concept of omnip-
otence - depends, in fact, upon the doctrine that
an omnipotent being can exercise His omnipotencein limiting His omnipotence*
McPherson goes on to talk about Sod voluntarily assuming
a 'snaffle and bit'. But if (1') Is true, how has Sod limited
His omnipotence? It is true that
(4) (S is a bachelor at t 3 pj (God brings it about
that S is married at t))
Does God thereby forfeit omnipotence by creating bachelor 3
at t? It does not seem so, and (4) is an obvious parallel of
(!')•
Another attempt was that made by Antony Flew
[ 5] who
maintains that it is
. . . entirely inconsistent to maintain
. . . both
that there is a creator and that there are other
authentically autonomous beings.
The argument given is this:
(5) God is creator
( 6 ) God is creator = (i) God created everything
ex nihilo
and (ii) God is the constant and
sustaining cause of
everything
(7) God is the constant and sustaining cause of every-
thing = Without God's onto-
logical underpropping everything
would collapse into non-existence.
.
. ( 8 ) Nothing happens independently of God's ultimate
undetermined determination and His
consenting ontological support
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(9)
.*.( 10 )
There is no (human) thought, choice, etc.,
independent of God 1 a ultimate un-
determined determination and His
consenting ontological support
There is no autonomous being not identical with
God
The key phrases are lifted directly from Flew, and since
they are introduced without explanation, the argument is a bit
difficult to evaluate. For instance, one might think that
God could keep all the things He created from collapsing into
non-existence without having to control all possible events
involving those creations - and if so, the argument fails -
but evidently the notion of ontological underpropping is
stronger than that, since it is behind the move from (7) to
(8). But if it is that strong, then (6) or (7) may not be
correct, in which case the argument is not problematic for
the theiat anyway.
In any case, the decisiveness of Flew's case has not
been established - at least, not in any obviously decisive
way.
It has also been suggested that omniscience and freedom
are incompatible. The strongest case for that position has
been made by Pike [12] although others (e.g., Richard Taylor
[19] ) have argued for related claims.
Pike presents a trilemma, but the following is the most
interesting and the most important horn, and is representative
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of the other two:
(11) If God believed at t
x
that 3 would do A at t0then if it was within s's power at tP to refrainfrom A, then it was within S' a power at u to do
something which would have brought it about that
God did not hold the belief He held at t
x
.
But (12) It is not within one's power at a given time todo something that would bring it about that
someone who held a certain belief at a time
prior to the time in question did not hold thatbelief at the time prior to the time in question.
From this pike infers
( 15 ) If God believed at t]_ that S would do A at tP ,then it was not within S's power at t„ to refrain
from A 2
If omniscience is construed as Knowledge - hence belief -
of all true propositions, then 3 seems to have lost the power
to refrain from anything he will in fact do, and to do anything
from which he will in fact refrain.
The manner in which the premises are stated may invite
accusations of scope confusions, so restatement may be help-
ful. Pike says
No action performed at a given time can alter the
fact that a given person held a certain belief at
a time prior to the time in question.
That means at least that
(1^) (P)(S)(S')(S believes at t, that P —> ^(3A)(S'
can do A at tp & (S' does A at tP y ro s believes
at t^ that P)))
If we allow 'A' to range over refrainings as being part of S's
repertoire, ( 14 ) implies
4o
(15) sod believes at tj_ that 3 does A at t0 —
>
\.S can refrain from a at t?
*
^(3 refrains from A at t > cu God believes
at t-^ that 3 does A at t2 );
But of course, since God is omniscient
U6) S refrains from A at t > ~ Sod believes at t,
that S does A at t.
Thus (17) God believes at
^ that S does A at t2 —
>
WS ban
refrain from A at t d
The argument is valid, and (16) appears to be a straight-
forward consequence of God's omnrecience. The intuition behind
(14) (which might be called the Humpty Dumpty thesis) is clear -
done is done and there is no remedy for that.
Pike obviously thinks that (1 7 ) is relevant to discussions
of S' a freedom, and given God's omniscience, that initially
looks plausible. If 3 can't refrain from A at t2 , or can't do
A at t
2 , then how could 3 be free with respect to A?
Let's consider some cases. Suppose that in a fit of pique
S demolishes his television set at t^. Having done that (and
given some easy assumptions) s can't then watch his favorite
program, which commences at t
g (immediately following t^.
From that, however, it does not follow that 3 couldn't have
watched his program. Had he merely chosen to vent his emotions
elsewhere, his set would have been intact and there would have
been no problem. Thus although the destruction pretty well
fixes things so that he now can't watch, it is irrelevant to
whether or not he oould have watched hie show. Thus although
W© might agree that (for appropriate values of p and A)
U«) P at —> s can't A at t
g
we must admit cases in which
(19) P at t^ -/-> S couldn't have A-ed
and thus (18) - even given the truth of P at
^
- does not
aeem to have any interesting consequences for S's freedom.
It might be objected that the above example is unfair
8 in 06 the antecedent action is one of S's own, whereas the
real issue involves actions or beliefs of others. But cases
avoiding that can be given. Suppose that S's neighbor S' came
over to see a program with S. If S' watched the set at tp
then at t2 S can't do anything about s' having watched it at
V But that obviously has nothing to do with S's freedom to
decide whether or not s' watches his set at t
x
. He could
have decided not to wait for his regularly scheduled fit of
pique, and could have destroyed the set before t
. Thus again,
what implies a can't need not imply a couldn'
t
,
yet the couldn't
seems to be what is of interest as far as freedom is concerned.
Of course, it might be objected that a crucial temporal
element is being overlooked. In the two cases given, the
reason why the couldn't didn't follow was that in each case the
agent in question could have taken some action prior to t^
,
or
taken some other action at t-^ which would have resulted in some
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situation other than that indicated by the antecedent. In
(17), that is not the case, since God has always had the
beliefs He has. In that case, 3 would not have acted prior
to every t^ at which God believed that 3 would do A.
However, that does not seem to establish much. The
situation is roughly this:
(i) P at t^ —> s can’t at t
( 1X ) ( P at t l 3 couldn’t have) because
S could have done differently prior
to t^
Given (17) and the eternality of God's believing
(in) God believes p at tQ —^ 3 can’t at t2
But what of
(iv) God believes p at tQ —> 3 couldn't have
Since (i) does not imply lack of freedom, neither,
presumably, does (iii). What is needed is (iv). According
to the above argument, the crucial fact is
( v ) ^(S could have done differently prior to t )
The argument might then be
(20) (iv) is false because (v) is false (paralleling (ii))
3ut (21) (v) is true
30 (22) (iv) is true
But that is not a good argument. The only conclusion that
can be drawn is that if (iv) is false, it is false for reasons
other than the missing falsity of (v). The conclusion could be
saved if it could be 0hown that
(5) (If (iv) i 8 false it is so because (v) is false)
but no such argument is advanced.
we can respond to Pike, then, by saying that In order to
establish his conclusion concerning freedom he needs to estab-
lish something like (iv), and that he hasn't. We might further
claim that (Iv) Is false since Sod holds the beliefs He does
only because He forsees what choices will in fact be made.
Pike does reply to that. He says that the response must be
'incoherent' since his argument establishes that foreknowledge
and freedom are incompatible, since whether or not it does
that is what is at issue, that does not seem to be an adequate
response.
Remaining to be met, however, are challenges aimed at
the structure of the defense itself, and they are not in
short supply. Objections have emerged corresponding to almost
every substantive claim contained in the traditional view.
It is an essential claim of the free will defense that a
world inhabited by free moral agents who freely achieve some
(usually unspecified) ratio of good to evil is superior to a
world populated only by unfree individuals, regardless of how
we might be inclined to evaluate the prevailing conditions in
the latter world. As Mackie notes
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... it must be argued that it is better on the
err thafth
6
',
1
th°
Uld a0t freely
> and, an t at ey should be innocent automata.
Although he seems to stand alone, MoOloskey [lo] refused
to let that by unchallenged. He says
It is clear than on omnipotent God could create
rational agents predestined always to make virtuousdecisions'; what is not clear is whether we
should describe such agents as having free will
. . . Which is more desirable, free will and moral
evil ... or pseudo-free will [and] absolutegoodness? I suggest that the latter is clearly
preferable. *
And again
God, were He omnipotent, could preordain thedecisions and the reasons upon which they were
based; and such a mode of existence would seem
to be in itself a worthy mode of existence, and
one preferable to an existence with free will,
irrationality, and evil.
Kany would object that without free will there is no
goodness at all, but McClosicey could accomodate that view with
only minor modification, by claiming that non-evil determination
was superior to free will, irrationality, and evil. As
indicated, not many have been convinced that there are some
mechanical modes of existence which are 'clearly preferable'
to all modes involving freedom and some evil (however little).
But even if a case could be made that that is in fact true,
the import is not obvious. To see why, we need to look at a
distinction first exploited (I believe) by Alvin Plantinga,
between a defense and a theodocy. A person attempting to show
that e.g., free will is in fact the justification for evil is
offering a theodocy; one arguing that e.g., free will is a
possible justification for evil is offering a defense.
Although some recent philosophers have claimed theodicity for
free will (for instance, Hartahorne [5] ) moat of those whom
we might call 'defenders' have been primarily concerned with
showing that free will was a possible justification. If so,
McOloskey has inflicted no damage. Had he shown that his
preference was necessarily correct, or that the defender's
preference conflicted with other essential features of the
defense, his attack would have been a serious one. But he
argues for neither of these points - indeed, he mkes no such
claims - and as long as it can be maintained merely that the
defender's view that a free world may be mere valuable is
coherent, the defense is still viable.
Most of the objections directed at the free will defense
have been more basic, being aimed at the very heart of the
defense, and have been somewhat similar to each other in
general outline. For instance:
It may be argued that free will is compatible with
less moral evil than in fact occurs on various
grounds
. . . these grounds establish that God
could have conferred free will upon us and at least
very considerably reduced the amount of moral evil
that would have resulted.' This is sufficient to
show that not all the moral evil that exists can
be justified by reference to free will alone.
McOloskey [lo]
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* Y °ould + n°t God have created beings with freewill who yet always choose good and never evil?
* ’ * there is nothing inherently impossible inGod b having created such beings ... if H e had,the state of the universe would be preferable toits actual state.
McPherson [U]
If there is no logical impossibility in a man'sireely choosing the good on one or on several
occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility
r^
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! f!
6ly ch008in£ the good on every occasion.
1
there was °Pen t0 Him the . .
. possibility
of mkln£ beings who would act freely but always
go right. Clearly, His failure to avail Himself
of this possibility [etc.]
MacKie [8]
The similarity is an important one, and can be seen in a
slight recasting of the foregoin. In McCloskey's passage we
seem to find
(24) 0 (men are free and freely generate less than n
amount of evil)
Thus (25) God could have brought it about that (men are free
and freely generate les3 than n amount of evil)
In the Mackie section:
(26) O ( men are free and freely choose good)
Thus (27) God could have brought it about that (men are free
and freely choose good)
Why should the defender worry about such conclusions?
Simply because if God could have guaranteed freedom without
permitting evil, then it cannot very well be claimed that the
value of freedom is the justifying reason for God's tolerating
evil
.
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Arguing that (24) and (26) arc false does not look
initially promising, so if the defender is to withstand this
Challenge, he should perhaps find grounds for rejecting the
inferences to (25) and (27).
The first move is an easy one. In earlier discussion it
seen that for purely logical reasons we cannot require an
omnipotent being to be able to produce just any logically
possible situation, but must be content with
(26) ^(cjod brings it about that P) God can bring
it about that P
Thus to get e.g., (27) what is needed is
(29) Q(God brings it about that (men are free and
freely choose good))
McPherson is a bit ahead of the game here, since what he
said amounts to
(29) 0 (God brings it about that (men are free and
freely choose good))
thus (50) God can bring it about that (men are free and
freely choose good)
This inference is warrented by (26), and if (29) is true,
the defender is indeed in trouble.^
Recall that in Chapter I it was stated that there were two
general routes over which an argument from evil might go, de-
pending upon what interpretation was given to the 'quasi-logical
'
rule that a good being eliminated all the evil it could. One
reading was that a good being eliminated every individual evil
it could and it was argued that this reading ran afoul of the
notion of justification. The other reading was that a good
being brought about the best situation it could. It was pointed
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But la (29) true? s.A. Brava [4] aaema to have been again
firat on the scene, objecting that although It was possible
that men always freely choose right, it was not possible for
Bod to make It the case that that situation obtained.
The question also came under extensive review by Plantings
[l4]
,
who said :
course, is not consistent; for ifGod brings it about that the^n He creates always
^what is right, then they do not do what is right
Plantmga maintained that people were confusing (29) with
(29a)
<> (God brings it about that (men are free), and
those free men always choose good)
and although lantinga was willing to grant the truth of (29a),
that admission was of no particular use to the atheologian,
since (29a) and (28) imply only that God can create free men
A battle of major proportions has been fought over this
issue - whether or not God can determine free choices - and
that this is a pivotal issue in evaluating the free will defense
has been variously pointed out by Plantings (e.g., [l4] ),
l°pm onW fitf?uSh that well be true, evil becomes a prob-e ly if it were necessarily true that the best world God
could create was devoid of evil. Suppose that we continue to
grant that all the best worlds are free worlds. In order to
argue in this second manner, the atheologian needs to establish
at least that God - being omnipotent - can bring about a free
world in which there is no evil. We have, in (28), an analog of
Chapter I (4b) which appears to be an acceptable principle
concerning omnipotence, and we can view McPherson's argument as
an attempt to show that God could have created a free non—evil
world, that He thus did not create the best world He could have,
and ultimately that thus He is not good — i.e., as an attempt to
develop the second line of argument.
Dewey j. Hoitenga Jr. [7 ] , and Paul Helm [fij
. Although this
battle has not been conspicuous for its arguments, neither
side has been baahflil about putting forth its position. Flew
[5] says that God can determine free choices. Plantinga [l4]
says that Flew is wrong. Hoitenga asserts that God can too
determine free choices. Frederick Ferre' [2 ] comes back that
that does not include the sorts of free choices that are
morally significant. Ninian Smart [l8] denies intelligibility
to the whole notion of determined free choices.
Oddly enough, McCloskey seems to be among those siding
with Plantinga. In the next to last paragraph of [lo]
McOloskey says:
* . . the question has not been fairly put. The
real alternative is, on the one hand, rational
agents with free wills ... and rational automata.
- whatever rational automata might be.
As indicated, not ail the atheologians have been inclined
to that degree of generosity, and a serious attempt to show
that a version of (29) was true was mounted by James E
Tomberlin and Frank McGuiness (henceforth 'JvicTom 1 ) [20].
McTom defined an A -property as a property 'of the form
"freely and argued that
(51) 0 (God causally brings it about that (some A-
property is instantiated))
McTom undertakes to snow that ( 31 ) is true on any
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reasonable view of causation, and tries to do this by showing
that (Jl) is true on both the weakest and the strongest
reasonable views of causation, since the correct view of
causation - whatever it turns out to be - is thus bracketed,
McTom presumes that (}1) will be true on that view as well.
The first view, McTom calls the 'physical necessity view'
and characterizea it aa
(52) p cauaea q = df p is a causally sufficient
condition for q
(the left aide can be symbolized aa ' p _»q»). We are given
the further expansion
( 55 ) P -^>q iff q is true in every physically
possible world in which p is true
'where it is understood by the set of all physically possible
—
rlda that subset of the set of all possible worlds whose
members are exactly those possible worlds in which the laws
of nature hold 1 •
This account of causation has problems, as McTom is
quick to point out. It should be stressed that ( 52 ) and (55)
are intended by McTom only to put a floor under the weaker end
of the causal theory spectrum. The problems with the view
itself will not become crucial.
Given this machinery, the following argument for ( 51 )
can be extracted s
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God creates free person 3
-*S has some A-property
5 has some A-property —> some A-property is
instantiated
God creates free person 3 —>some A-property is
instantiated
(P)(Q)((P —?Q)
3od creates free person 5 some A-property is
instantiated
(S)(P)(Q)(((S can cause p) & (p — q)) —
>
S can cause Q)
God can create free person 3
God can cause it to be the case that (some A-
property is instantiated)
0(God causes it to be the case that (some A-
property is instantiated))
and from that McTom concludes ( 51 ) -
(51) <>(God causally brings it about that (some a-
property is instantiated))
There are some minor modifications we might wish to make
in the argument, but by and large if we read ( 31 ) as
(5la ) 0(God causally brings it about that ( 3 F)(F is
instantiated
)
)
where F is an A—property, then the argument is perhaps de-
cisive. Unfortunately for the atheologian, no theist denies
(Jla) at all. In fact, (Jla) seems true and most defenders
would gladly grant that. What the defender is not about to
grant, however, and the only relative of ( 51a) the falsity of
which is crucial to him is
W
( 55 )
( 56 )
( 57 )
( 58 )
( 59 )
( 40 )
( 41 )
( 42 )
52
(51b) 0(3 F)(F is an A-property and God causally
brings it about that F is instantiated)
God can surely bring it about that 3 freely does some-
thing or otnsr, which the above argument supports, or even
that 3 freely acts, but that argument does not establish that
for any relevant arbitrary A-property - say, freely choosing
good - God can causally bring it about that it is instantiated.
McTom proceeds to argue for (Jl) using the stronger view
of causation, but exactly the same thing happens as happened
above. Thus the relevant reading of (51) - (51b) - i 8 not
established.
In [9] in reply to Grave's objection to (29), Mactcie seems
to try to stake out a halfway position between ( 29 ) and ( 29a) -
softening the view to avoid the contradiction he is ready to
recognize, yet retaining enough clout to lay low the defender.
He says
If uheir being of this sort [free and untarnished]
is logically possible, then God's making them of
tnis sort is logically possible, for there is no
logical conflict between being of this sort and
being made. There would, of course, be a contra-
diction in the notion of God's making men freely
choose the good - if He maxes them do this, then
they are not free — but not in the quite different
notion of God's making men such that they always
freely choose the good.
Evidently, we are to distinguish between
(*3 ) God maxes 3 freely choose right
and (44) God makes S the sort of being that freely
chooses right
5)
(Aj) is held contradictory, (1.4) not. (44) is not
initially very clear, but it presumably involves something
Uke thiS
' “hUe 30,1 oannot «Ae S freely choose good. He
can create 8 having some (possibly subjunctive) property or
characteristic
- F - which is such that everyone who does
have it does indeed choose rightly freely unfailingly.
Now if God does make it the case that 3 is F, then al-
though God does not make S choose rightly, there is obviously
some link between God's creative act and 3's subsequent choice
of right. Consider a parallel, my office mate is the sort
who, if hie Physics is misplaced, will freely choose to vent
hls frustrations non-stop in Greek until he locates it. The
ceremony is quite colorful, so, wishing to share it with a
friend, I hide the Physics
. There is a sense in which, as
the scene is played out, I have made him choose to tinge the
air, albeit in a weak sense of 'made'. That sort of weak
sense is presumably the sort of thing involved in God making
S the sort who freely chooses right* Thus
(^) ^ 0 (God makes a (strong sense) 3 freely choose
right)
but ( 46 ) 6 (God makes
w
(weak sense) S freely choose
right)
(These sorts of distinctions are due to Plantings.)
Let us look briefly at how the strong sense of 'makes'
works. The following seem to be true for contingent P and Q:
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( 47 )
( 48 )
I f S ma kes
g P the case,
5 makes^ Q the case
and p entails Q, then
If 3 makes
s p the case, and S makes
case that p implies Q, then 3 ma
case
a
it the
kes
8 Q the
(*9 ) If S makes
g p the case, and p implies Q,
Q is -the case then
(50)
'P implies Q'
erially.
That S make8
8 p the case,
but does not entail it,
makeg it the case that
entail that 3 makes Qs
and that P implies Q
and that S does not
P implies Q, does not
the case
can be interpreted either sub junctively or mat-
It is evidently part of Mackie's story that
(51) If s is F, then S freely chooses right
If (51) is an entailment, then by (47) and (45)
(52) cj 0 (God makes
q
S is F the case)
So if (51) is an entailment, then if God can make 3 be F,
it must be in the weak sense of 'make'. But that will not
prove helpful.
The weak sense applies and the strong sense does not in
just those cases in which some factor other than the agent in
question must be taken into account - where there is something
not under the agent's control which figures into the case.
Otherwise, by ( 47 ) and ( 48 ), the strong sense would apply.
Thus if God can make
w 3 be F, He can do so only in virtue of
reasons for which He is not entirely responsible, and thus we
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have no guarantee that He is morally required to do so. If
those other factors are not forthcoming, then God cannot
"ahe
u
S be F, so we cannot conclude that God can make - even
weakly - s choose right#
Mackie presumably, then, has to deny that (51) is
necessary, and hold that it is a weaker statement. I f he does
so, he seems perhaps to be in a position to claim that God
make
0 S be F, and that since it is a contingent truth
that if 3 is F he freely chooses right, then, by (49), he
will choose right freely but will not be made
B to do so, and
hence the problem is avoided.
But we must look at (51) again. If (51) is true in virtue
of God making, it true, then we do, via (48), have the same
problem. Thus (51) must be neither necessary nor made true
8
by God. Indeed, under such conditions, (50) says that the
problem has been avoided. Unfortunately, there is another
problem just like the first one. The argument depends on the
truth of (51) and S’s being p. Yet God cannot be behind the
truth of both at once without running up against (45). He has
to take His pick and rely on factors outside His control for
the truth of the other. That being the case, God cannot guar-
antee anyone freely choosing right. If God foresees that (51)
will be true, He can perhaps make 3 be F and get the desired
result. But that He can, if He can, does not follow from there
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being
-no logical conflict between being of thle sort and being
-ade', since the 'made' here must be taken in the weak sense.
Thus we need to be given some view of (44) other than the one
suggested, or reasons for rejecting (47) or (48).
So Mackie's suggestion that although God can’t make 3
freely choose right He can make S of the sort that freely chooses
right, does not appear successful. Whether or not some possible
person 3 would, if created, do only good, seems to be something
that God simply cannot regulate - even by indirection - within
bounds that would warrent ascription of culpability to Him.
The outlines of the battle over (29) can now be made out
a bit more clearly. The defender insists upon (45) and is
willing to grant (46). However, given the nature of the weak
sense of 'makes', there is no principle corresponding to the
clarified version of (28) - i. e .,
(28a) 0 (God makes 8 p the case) —> God can (actually)
bring it about that
P is the case
employing the weak sense of 'makes'. It is false that
(28b) 0 (God raaK.es
w p the case) —> God can (actually)
bring it about that
P is the case
Whether or not God is able to bring about P in this case
depends, as stated previously, on factors outside His control.
Those factors may materialize, but they also may not, and if
they do not then God cannot as a matter of fact bring P about.
57
Thus the consequent of (28b) is contingent, whereas the ante-
cedent is necessary (given the appropriate restrictions on p).
Hence, (28b) is false. Thus the truth of (46) is no problem
for the defender. The truth of
(5?)
right
3" brl"S U ab0llt
w
that men freel
J' choose
might be problematic, but since it can be a best contingently
true it cannot be used to show either that the free will
defense has internal logical problems, or that God and evil
are logically incompatible, unless it can be shown to follow
from theologically essential doctrines. But no case for
either the truth or the theistic essentiality of (5J) has been
made.
The above considerations more or less parallel the
response to Ma Okie's position that was composed by Plantings
[14] . That response, however, was considered by William
Rowe [17] to be defective. Rowe was willing to admit, in
effect, that both (45) and (46) were true, and concedes the
contingency of (55). These concessions notwithstanding, Rowe
thougn that a successful atheological argument could be distilled
from Mackie's remarks. Up to this point, emphasis had been
laid only on the claims of God's goodness and omnipotence, but
now the claim of omniscience was also enlisted, with the result
that the debate took a novel twist. The argument;
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(54)
(55)
(56)
God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly lyood
For- every free possible person P who, if created,
would perform morally evil actions, there is
another free possible person p 1 who is exactlylike P except that p'
,
if created, would neverperform morally evil actions
If God is omniscient, then He knows with respectto any free possible person whether that person,
f created, would or would not perform morally
evil actions J
(57) If nod is omnipotent, then He can create thosefree possible persons who, if created, would
never perform any morally evil actions
Given (54) we can conclude, of course, that
( 5G ) God can create those free possible persons who,
if created, would never perform any morally evil
actions
Howe continues
(59) If God can create those free possible persons
who, if created, would never perform any morally
evil actions, and if God is wholly good and
omniscient, then any free persons croated by
God never perform a morally evil action.
Thus (60) No free person created by God ever performs a
morally evil action.
but (58) is what is of interest at the moment.
Does (58) or does it not presuppose that there are free
possible persons who, if created, would always freely avoid
evil? It seems to, and that there are such is a point that
not all have been willing to concede. Grave |4j was again the
first on the scene, both anticipating and answering the point,
saying
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th«\\h
h 16 n° nece88ai-y contradiction in Bayingat there was open to God the possibility of 'Lkimibeings who would act freely but always go right'.For It might be meant not that Cod could have Id
e
beings who would freely and necessarily, but beinvawho would freely and contingently, always go right.
bohav
S “Very P°asibl « ^ee agent woulde e in every combination of oiroumetanoee, ought
predict °hot
°nly th° 8S uh0“ Ho oouU "Ob causally
P , bu see, as never once turning away fromgoodness. The trouble Is that for all we knowthere might be none ... We are quite in the darkabout such hypothetical actualizations of possibletree choices.
A bit la ter
, plantings
1 14J gave a much more explicit ob-
jection along this same line. Rowe, however, wae not satisfied
with this basic sort of objection. Noting first that
the substance of Plantinga's reply to Mackie ia thatthe proposition
^ ) God can instantiate possible persons
containing the property of always
freely doing what is right
is contingent [and that thus Mackie has shown no
logical problem for the theist]
Rowe then points out that ( [6l] ) is not a premise in the above
argument at all, but only the (rephrased) consequent of (57).
Of course, that the consequent of a conditional is contingent
need not make the conditional itself contingent, so if the
above is Plantinga's criticism, then if the argument Rowe
extracts from Mackie is good, then perhaps plaritinga has not
really had the last word after all.
But let u s see what happens if we make the apparent pre—
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supposition of (56) a bit more explicit by recasting ( 57 ) as
(^ 7a) if there are free possible persons who, if
created, would never perforin any morally evil
actions, then if God is omnipotent, then God
can create those free possible persons who,
if created would never perform any morally
evil actions.
(58) is still available given (54), (55), and
(62) There are free possible persons who, if created,
would perform morally evil actions
But there are problems here. If Rowe is to avoid the
charge of using contingent premises himself - and he must, if
showing a logical difficulty with ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) is the object -
either ( 62 ) must be necessary, or it must be entailed by ( 54 ).
It is not at all clear how (62) - if contingent - is to be
derived from (54) and that option does not seem viable. On
the other hand, if ( 62 ) is necessary, then ( 62 ) and ( 55 )
entail that it is necessarily the case that there are free
possible persons who, if created, would go right. Now an
omnipotent being can make it the case that any possible person
exist; what is not controllable is what sort of person that
person, once created, will turn out to be. So if there are
persons such that they would of necessity go right if created,
then any omnipotent, omniscient being could necessarily bring
it about that there were free perfect persons. Yet Rowe admits
that Plantings' s argument for the contingency of that statement
is correct. Perhaps we are meant to conclude only that it is
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necessarily the case that there is seme free person or other
who would go right if created, still, from that and ( 57a)
we can conclude that it is necessarily the case that an
omnipotent being can bring it about that those persons exist.
But if what Plantings has tried to show is that a being can
be omnipotent and omniscient and still be unable to instantiate
free possible persons who always do right - and it is clear
that that is what Plantings means for ( 61 ) to say - then
Rowe cannot hold the above position and still agree that
Plantinga 1 s argument ia correct. Yet he says
Plantinga
' a highly original argument that ( [6l]
)
is contingent is, I believe, correct.
Evidently, then, Rowe must give up the view that (62)
is necessary, but if so, then he has not produced an argument
that avoids Plantinga 's charge of premise contingency.
But suppose that, despite appearances, (62) follows from
some essential theological claim. Given (62), (54), (55), and
(57a), we can conclude
(65) There are free possible persons who, if created,
would do no evil, and God can create them
From ( 65 ) and (54) we are evidently to conclude that no
free person created by God does any evil
- (60). The inference
may not be a good one, i. e
., (59) may be false. The intuition
Rowe seems to be relying on is that God can look into the future,
see who does evil, and simply neglect to create any such person.
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But we must ask - which possible future does God look into?
Different combinations of persons delineate different worlds,
and one and the same person may act differently in different
worlds. 5 might do right in w and wrong in w'
,
and 5 * the
opposite. If God can .create either w or w', then it is true
that there are free possible persons who, if created, would,
in the appropriate worlds, do right. Unfortunately, in
either case God also gets a bad guy. Thus the truth of ( 65 )
does not, without a quantifier error, help us get to the
conclusion that God can bring forth a world in which all men
do no evil. God cannot just create parts of a number of
worlds and glue them together to make one. And it will do
no good to protest that it is certainly possible that God
bring about a world in which all men freely choose right.
We've been there before.
There is one other specific problem with the argument,
and that is that (55) also seems to be false. Suppose that
Were p created, p would perform moral evil
According to (55), there is some P' sharing all of Ps
properties except that
(65) Were P' created, P' would perform no moral evil
But if P and p' are just alike, with that exception, they
share among other things individuating essential properties,
and hence are one and the same individual. Since no one can
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both perform and not perform an act n , *yc.ii.ui , the person is question
ia uncreatable.
One response might be to separate P and f> into separate
Individuals, but that would make a shambles of any hope for
necessity that (55) might have. Another reeponse might be that
if there were a world in which P, if created, would do wrong,
there is another world just like it except that in in P, if
created, would do right. That suggestion ie unhelpful for
reasons to emerge shortly.
The argument under discussion trades on the intuition
that God could, by selective creation based on foreknowledge,
bring it about that only people who would freely refrain from
evil would get created. That intuition was, in various guises,
iuiriy widespread, a version of it was employed by pike
[15]
and reconstructed - although not advocated - by Peter y. windt
[2l]. As usual, it was directed against Plantinga. In a number
of places
( [l5], [l6] ) Plantinga holds that since God cannot
mke9 a person have e.g., the property freely chooses A or
have the property freely refrains from A even though a person
free with respect to A presumably has one or the other, the
creation of a free person is a two step process. God instantiates
P (the person in question) with all his essential and determined
properties, and P himself has to make the choice of freely
choosing or freely refraining from A. If we can for the moment
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apeak of a possible person as a set of properties, we can say
that there is a inaximum proper subset the elements of which
God can actualize in creating p. Given e.g., (45), p will
have other properties that God cannot be responsible for.
Given that, Windt provides a simplified version of a
defense formulated by Plantings. (This defense will be
examined later; the objection is what is of concern at the
moment.) The defense:
Let P be a free perfect possible person (freely
refraining from a)
Let P
x
be the maximum subset of p that God can
actualize (in a strong sense of 'actualize 1
)
Let I_ be P^'s instantiation
(6 >) in order to instantiate P, God must instantiate P^
(^7) There can be at most one instantiation of p,
,
since
P-^ contains individuating properties
(68)
it is possible that, if created, I would do A,
and it is possible that, if created, I would
refrain from A
~
( 69 ) ^ I would do A, if created, then if God creates I
He cannot instantiate P
(70) If God does not create I_, He cannot instantiate P
(71) I ^ would do A, if created, then God cannot
instantiate P
(72) It is possible that God cannot instantiate P
Windt continues
Since this argument can be applied to any possible
person including the property always freely does what
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ss.i.rxsTr-better to have a world with
.orally f^ee personsnd some am, than a world with no freedom at all we
WJ -“PPO- that under such circumstances, Qodwould choose to instantiate the best possible oersonshe can, though none of them may be perfect.
The objection follows:
Let us grant that if I would do A, if created, then
?
d create I without allowing some morll evilto exist, yet why cannot God simply create some
?
Uati °n 0f P
l'
wh0 free ly would refrain
of P?
° ir
^ and thUS W l° would be an instantiation
Wmdt does not push the objection and thinks that Plantinga
can escape, and in that I think he's absolutely correct, since
the objection does not seem to be a good one. To begin with,
what is involved in claiming that there are various instant-
iations of a possible person? Presumably such things as
variations in non-essential properties, or the inhabiting of
different worlds. Of course, there cannot be more than one
instantiation of any person in any give world, so the objection
evidently involves a number of different worlds. Suppose, then,
that we consider two instantiations of P^ - p' and p"
.
pi
performs A, and p" refrains, and that is their only difference,
aside from whatever that difference entails. Since they must
not share a world, put P' in w' and P» in w"
,
with w' and w«
again differing only in that A is freely chosen in w' and not
in w", and whatever that entails.
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Mow tt is admitted that free cbcicee are outside Sod's
control
,
for logical reasons. Thus, when Sod is ashed to
pick between P' and P"
,
He is really being ashed to see to it
that e.g., „» is the world to be, so that when P
x
is
instantiated, p n will result.
Unfortunately, the request is impossible to grant. In
the case specified, w' and w« differ only in that A is freely
chosen in w', and freely avoided in w"
. But it has been con-
that whether A is freely chosen or freely avoided is not
in God's power. Thus God no more has a way of guaranteeing
w" over w' than He has of guaranteeing that pp if created,
will, say, freely choose A. The suggestion boils down to a
proposal that God try to sneak up on an ungraspable handle.
Stealth will not enhance the grip.^
We can now make out the deferred objection to the last
proposal for saving the truth of (55). If (55) is given the
suggested reading it becomes
(55a) For every free possible person P and possible
world w, if it is the case that were w made
actual then the resulting instantiation of P
would go wrong, there is another world w 1 just
like w except that were w' made actual, the
resulting instantiation of P would go right.
(5ja) may be true, but that no longer implies
LGrave [k] makes a point that may come close to this.
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(57b) 3
?
d
^
B 01Dni
-Pobbllt, then He can bring itabout that the appropriate world w' exists
It might be argued that 3od perhaps has some way of
pinning down a desired world, but if that is the case then the
presumption that worlds are only individuated by their truths,
etc, must be given up, and some additional criterion added.
No proposals are handy.
(There is also a serious difficulty involved in the way
in which subjunctives are used in the last two objections.
The general problem involved will be discussed at a later point.)
So far, then, the objections to the free will defense
that God should have made men such that they are perfect
although not making them perfect, that Sod should have created
only persons He knew would go straight, and that He should
have picked only the desirable instantiations of those He was
going to create, have all failed, as did the earlier objections
that omnipotence and free will were incompatible, that
omniscience and free will were incompatible, or that Sod should
have created automata#
There is one final objection to the free will defense,
and its earliest recent statement comes from Mackie [8].
Mackie more or less suggests that God borrow a page from physics
and employ an analog of Maxwell's Demon, although given the high
purpose involved we might wish to employ Maxwell's angel instead.
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Mackie says
;
Why should He not
but intervene when
wrongly?
leave men free to will rightly,
He sees them beginning to will
This is what Grave calls 'the policy
sham fights', and there is a standard
most theiste have found satisfactory:
• • . of promoting
response to it which
To create creatures capable of moral good, there-tore, He must create creatures capable of moral
evil; but He cannot create the possibility of
moral evil and at the same time prohibit its
actuality ... So He could forestall the
occurrence of moral evil only by removing the
possibility of moral good.
Plantings [l4]
Clement Dore [l] is even more explicit:
If it is true that an omnipotent being would haveintervened to prevent Jones from doing wrong on
some given occasion, C,, had it been the case that
otherwise Jones would have done wrong on Ch, then
Jones had no real option with respect to wrongdoing
on 0j_: he could not have done other than avoid it.
Hence, Jones would not freely have avoided wrong-
doing on 0^.
The above sort of doctrine also figures prominently in a
number of arguments that Dore presents in support of the free
will defense. All are related, so only one will be discussed.
It goes :
Since these people [free, perfect persons] are free
as well as perfect, it must be that God would have
permitted their instantiations to engage in wrong-
doing i
f
they had so chosen. And there is no morally
relevant difference between the actions God would
have performed if these instantiations had been going
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to do wrong ( i.e., actions of permitting them towrong), and Sod '
3
actual actions of permittingthe people whom He in fact creates to go morallyastray. Now God would have been justified in
Jg
r
i
° r“lnS
l
he f°rmer ' Hence it must be false thatH reprehensible for permitting the latter ones.
The argument seems to be something like this:
(75)
(74)
(75)
(S)(S is free God would not intervene even
were S to choose evil)
S is free and perfect God would not inter-
vene even were 3 to
choose evil
God would be
perfect
justified in creating 3 free and
•'•(76) God would have been justified in not inter-
vening had 3 freely chosen evil
But as it turns out, God created
who did freely choose evil, and
(77) God does not intervene
chooses evil
e»g., free person p
even though p freely
Says Dore, there is no difference between God not inter-
vening in the case of S, and His not intervening in the case of
P. Thus
(7) ^ (God is unjustified in not intervening even
though p freely chooses evil)
The argument is not easy to evaluate. Evidently involved
in the step to (76) is something like
(79) A B
"( 8°) is justified in being such that A —^-God is
justified in being such that 3
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In the case of persons other than Ood, that sort of
inference might lead to Oood Samaritan type difficulties -
for instance, being justified in being truly repentant for
evil deeds would entail being justified in performing evil
deeds - but perhaps we can allow that in the case of Sod no
such problems arise.
We can recast (75) as
(81) God is justified in being such that 3 is free
and perfect
The locution is awkward, but will for the moment suffice.
It is then possible to conclude that
(82) Qod is justified in being such that He would
not intervene even were 3 to choose evil
Something like that is evidently going on, since other-
wise (75) and (74) would be irrelevant to ( 76 ), and ( 76 )
would be merely unsupported assertion. But something seems
to have gone wrong in any case. It might be that God was
justified in creating 3 in part because He foresaw that 3
would avoid evil. How is His justification in that case
relevant to the case where God foresees that 3 will not avoid
evil, but creates 3 anyway?
Perhaps that can be made a little clearer. (82) might
be read as
( 85 ) God is justified in being such (in free perfect
world w) that in the nearest world to w in which
3 chooses evil He does not intervene (in that world)
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Does it follow from that that
(84) In the nearest world to w In which 8 chooses
evil, j0d is justified In not intervening
Dore's conclusion Is that It must be false that God Is
reprehensible for permitting the evils that do exist. I take
it that what he means- is that God's permitting evils does not
m itself entail reprehenaibility. That conclusion could be
gotten from (84), since if (84) is true then there is at
least one world in which God does not intervene, there is
evil, and yet God is not reprehensible.
But (84) may not follow from (flj). Consider a parallel.
Suppose that country A is considering an unjustified and
reprehensible attack upon country B. That country B is
attacked is not sufficient to justify the destruction of the
world, and the ruler of country c knows that country A would
not take such a risk. In order to forestall the attack, the
ruler oi c publicly has an electronic device implanted in hie
brain which has the following function: if B is attacked, the
device will produce an irresistable stimulus forcing the ruler
of C to push the ultimate button. In short, the ruler acquiree
a certain conditional property - he is now such that were B
attacked, he would blow up the world. He acquires this pro-
perty knowing full well that it will in fact be effective in stop-
ping the planned attack. Under the circumstances, he might
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be justified in taking this course, even though, ex hypothesi.
an attack on B would not justify the explosion.
In the same way, Sod might be justified in being such
that were 3 to go wrong He would not intervene, knowing in
advance that He will not be called upon to exercise the
property - out not be justified in not intervening if 3 m
fact was going to choose wrong - i.e., He might not be
justified in being such if He knew He would be called upon
"to exercise the property.
If so, Dore's argument need not be admitted valid.
But we can reject the argument in any case because (75)
is false. The argument for (7J) is just the passage quoted
earlier as a response to Mackie's Maxwell’s angel proposal.
That passage asserts the inconsistency of
(85)
(86)
and ( 87 )
Jones avoids wrongdoing on 0-^
Jones is free relative to the act in question on o
x
Were it the case that were he to be free he would
not avoid the wrongdoing on 0, , then Jones would
not be (allowed to be) free relative to the actin question on 0
],
But (85) arid ( 86 ) are consistent, and in general if Q (AaB)
then
(88) a
(89) B
and (90) (B > ^ A) > ^ B
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are consistent (wh^rA i\ i/ again represents the subjunctive
connective), in particular
(91) ( (B > ~ A ) > ro B) -/-} r^J B
yet (75) asserts an instanee of the negation of (91) (transposed )
.
But if (75) ls false, then not only does Dore's argument
fell, but Mackie's objection still stands. As a matter of
feet, to this point, it has not been adequately handled by
theists. However, we do not have the machinery necessary to
evaluate Maoicie’s objection just yet, so further discussion
of it will be deferred.
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CHAPTER III
The situation as it has been developed to this point is
tnie: the atheologians have failed to establish that the
claim that both God and evil exist is inconsistent and thus
have not refuted defenses in general, and have failed to show
that the free will defense in particular is defective. The
defenders, on the other hand, have failed to find a free will
defense that will work. We apparently have a standoff.
However, there is one attempt to demonstrate the viability
of a free will defense which to this point has received only
incidental glances and which must now be examined more fully.
The attempt in question is the most recent of Alvin Plantings.
Plantinga's attempt is complex. Before plunging into its
formalities it would perhaps be helpful to try to see exactly
what some of the employed intuitions are. Most of this chapter
will be devoted to a non-critical recapitulation of Plantinga's
views, and will end with a discussion of what little published
criticisms of Plantinga's defense there is.
The most convenient point of departure is the series of
transformations that Mackie's quasi—logical rule concerning
omnipotence underwent. The original claim, recall, was that
if God were omnipotent then
(1) God could bring about any situation whatever
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But since, of course, even omnipotent beings presumably
have to observe logical laws, God's omnipotence could not
guarantee anything stronger than
(2) God could bring about any possible situation
whatever
However, for reasons suggested by Plantings and noted in
Chapter I, even (2) is too strong and must be replaced by
(5) God could bring about any situation consistent
with His having brought it about
It might not be immed iately obvious what effect all this
might have on the atheological case. It looks as though the
a theologian can grant the defender his predilection for free
worlds and still present a compelling argument. It is, he
might say, perfectly possible that God create and the result-
ant world be free from evil, yet contain free individuals.
Given that and (3), we could easily infer that God could have
caused such a maximal situation to be realized, i.e., could
have brought about such a world. Once granted that, the
a theologian could formulate the remainder of his argument
along standard lines.
Of course, arguing in that manner requires that we read
(5) as something like
(4) 0(God brings about S) —^ God is able to bring
about 3
At this pass, plantings springs an ambush, which can be
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take, as consisting of two charges: (i) that (4) is multiply
ambiguous and (ii) that once the ambiguities are sorted out,
there is left no version of (4) that is both true and useful
to the atheologian. Cur first task, then, in following
Plantings' s trail, is to set out the various renderings of (4).
AS was seen in an earlier section, such terms as 'cause',
males', 'bring about', etc., are ambiguous, having both a
strong sense and a weak sense. Thus for arbitrary situation
S, (A) might mean
(Aa) O' (God brings about 5)
(4b)
(Ac)
(Ad)
0 (God brings about
Q S)
0 (God brings about 3)
w '
O (God brings about s)
» God is able to bring
about 33
> God is able to bring
about,, 3w
> God is able to bring
about 8 3
* God is able to bring
about 3
w
(Since the variable in (4a)
- (4d) ranges over situations,
we run into no relevant problems in considering maximal sit-
uations - i.e., worlds - and for the present will simply con-
strue 3 as a variable over worlds.)
uiven the ambiguity of ’brings about', it seems that
Plantinga is right on count (i): (A) is indeed ambiguous. The
import of that, however, might not be immediately evident. The
atheologian needs only any one of the four readings plus merely
the logical possibility of God's bringing about (in the approp-
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riate sense) soma free perfect world. But aren't there free
perfect worlds that In any (every) sense of 'bring about'
whatever, it is at least logically possible that God bring
them about? Planting.'* answer is 'no', and the reason is
tied up in just what it is for God to create a world. In
[2] Plantinga says
... the creation of a world containing moralgood is a cooperative venture; it requires the
uncoerced concurrence of significantly free
creatures. But then the actualization of a
world w containing moral good is not up to Godalone, it also depends upon what the signifi-
cantly free creatures of w would do if God createdthem and placed them in the situations w contains.Of course, it is up to God whether to create freecreatures at all; but if He aims to produce moralgood, then He must create significantly free
creatures upon whose cooperation He must depend.
p. 190
The view here is that God (or any omnipotent being) can
strongly create or bring about only specified parts of any
world containing free individuals. God cannot strongly make
other segments of that world actual without destroying the
stipulated freedom of the individuals involved. Thus for any
world containing free persons, there is some limit to how much
of that world God can be strongly responsible for, or, we can
aay, there is a maximal segment of that world that God can and
does strongly actualize in bringing that world about.
Consider, for example, a world in which a person P freely
chooses to do A. If God strongly brings it about that F chooses
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A, then that choice is not free, since the choice is stipulated
free in w, it is not poeeibie that God strongly brings it about
in w that P freely choosea A. Thus it is not poaaible that
God atrongiy actualize every aigment of w, and hence it is not
poaaible that God atrongiy bring it about that w ia actual.
The same can be eaid concerning any free world whatever,
and conaequently (4a) and (4b) are of no use to the atheologian.
They are, no doubt, true, but no concluaion about God's being
le to create specified free worlds can be gotten from then
for the simple reason that their antecedent can never be true
with respect to free worlds.
(4c) does not look any more helpful, since if what has
just been said is right, the consequent of (4c) has to be
false. If it is not possible that God bring about some
free world w
,
then we may conclude that He (and any other
omnipotent being) is not able to do so. Thus either the
antecedent of (4c) - and hence also (4d) - is false, or else,
or else (4c) itself is false. If the former, then (4c) and
(4d ) become just as useless and (4a) and (4b), and it begins
to look as though the sketched atheological argument contains
a faise premise in the form of an assertion that it is at
least possible that God bring about a free perfect world. It
will presumable be admitted, then, that (4c) is false. That
might be admitted anyway, on the intuitive grounds that the
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possibility of achieving some end in collaboration with other
beings need not entail anything about achieving that end in
the absence of such collaboration.
We are left, then, with (Ad). Plantings will admit the
truth of the antecedent for arbitrary world w, but will be
obliged to argue that there is no entailment between ante-
cedent and consequent.
Why, to begin with, would Plantings grant that for
arbitrary free world, it is logically possible that God create
it? It looks risky. Consider
(5) God does A —> God is able to do A
Thus (6) 0(God does A) —> <>(God is able to do A)
Now if Plantings admits that
(7) 0 (God brings about w)
w '
for arbitrary w, he must also presumably admit
(8) <>(God is able to bring about w)
w '
for any w whatever. But if (Ad) is false, there must be a
world that is possibly brought about
- and hence such that
w
it is possible that God is able to bring it about - but
w
which God is in fact unable to bring about
. Thus if
w
Plantings wants to maintain the generality of (7) but in
effect deny (4d), he must admit - indeed demonstrate - that
(9) (3w)(0(God is able to bring about w) & ru (God
is able to bring about wn
w
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We seem to have a ease in ( 9 ) where no logical law stops
Ood, yet something else does, even though Sod is omnipotent.
And just to make it all worse, in order not to fatally weaken
the defense, the required demonstration must not be a non-
logical one. We can also view (9) as a claim that for some
worlds, whether or not God can create them is a purely
contingent matter.
But first things first. Why admit that for any free
world whatever, it is possible that God bring about that
w
world? The reasons go back to what it is to create a free
world, as discussed a moment ago, there is a raximal seg-
ment of the world in question which God can strongly actual-
ize, but developments beyond that point are out of His hands.
Whatever those developments may be, the whole process may
then be described as the weak actualization of that world.
N° W slnce the subsequent turnings are beyond God's area of
responsibility, obviously nothing that God does entails how
those further events go, except in the uninteresting sense
that one cannot freely climb the Matterhorn if God placed no
such mountain in the world. Within those loose logical
parameters, things can go in any direction whatever. Thus for
any specific direction, it is logically possible that God
actualizes the maximal segment and that things go in that
direction. Thus it is logically possible that God weakly
ej
actualize the world consisting of that maximal segment and
that development from it. For instance, consider a world
w in which there are free persons and none of them ever do
evil. It is possible that Ood does all that He can do toward
bringing about „ - actualizes the maximal segment - and that
the resultant free persons never do any evil. Thus it is
possible that Sod bring about
w
that world w. similar
considerations suffice to show that for any world, that
possibility holds.
At this point, the complications begin. I f God act-
ually some maximal segment T involving a person 3 who is
free with respect to one act A, 3 may subsequently do A, or
S may subsequently refrain from A. Both of these event-
ualities are logically possible outgrowths of exactly the
same maximal segment. Consider the world in which God
actualizes T and s then freely does A, and call the world
w. Let the world in which God actualizes T and then 3 freely
retrains from A be w'
. w and w' are of course different
worlds, but they share exactly the same maximal segment - God
does exactly the same thing in creating either world - and
if de does more than T, the resultant world is neither w nor
w', since T is the maximal segment, i.e., the absolute
maximum that God can do without curtailing the freedom of 3
with respect to A
. By extrapolation, it can be seen that for
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every possible maximal segment involving free persons, there
are a number of distinct worlds that share that segment.
two worlds Bhare a maxinal segment T, and if T
covers all the things under God's direct control, then what-
is that differentiates those two worlds must be out-
age Ood's direct (strong) control
- indeed, given the nature
of maximal segments and freedom, outside the control of any
possible omnipotent being. Given that situation, God cannot
control which of, say, w or w' would result were He to
actualize T. suppose he wished to bring about w. In order to
do that, all God could do would be to actualize T. Were He
to do more, whatever world resulted would not be w. But so
far, nothing has happened which would guarantee
. over »<
.
In fact, what God does in attempting to bring about w is
precisely what He would do were He trying to bring about w'.
Of course, God might know which world would result from His
doing T, but the point at the moment is that there is no
special push He could give that would guarantee the one over
the other*
In any case, it is at least possible that God does T
and that w results, and it is also possible that God does T
and that w' results, i.e*,
(10) 0 (Ood brings about
w w)
and (11) 0 (God brings about w'
)
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Now if (4d) i 0 true, then
( 12 ) God ia able to bring about
w
w
and (15) God is able to bring about w 1
w
but Plantinga is going to try to show that either (12) or
(1J) 13 false, thereby
.showing (4d) false.
Suppose that God were to do T. That involves God
creating the appropriate physioal universe, creating 3
,
and
putting S in a position to choose to do A or to refrain, once
S is in that situation he has to either choose A or choose to
refrain - one or the other. That being so, it see™ that it
must be either true or not true that
(U ) Were God to d0 T, S would freely choose to do A
But no natter which truth value we pick, says Plantinga,
we can then show that there is a world that God is not able
to bring about (or could not have brought about) even weakly.
Is (14) true? Then observe what happens if God tries to bring
about w fo do that, as we've seen, God must do exactly T.
out since (14) is true, doing T results in S'a choosing A and
the world in which that occurs is w, If God tries to do some-
thing other than T, the resultant world won't be w' either,
since God's doing exactly T ia stipulated as a constituent of
w'. So all that God can do in order to create w' is to do T,
and that, as it turns out, simply does not work.
But (14) is, if true, only contingently true. What if it
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ia false? In that case, bringing about w praaenta a problem.
Again, to create w, 3od roust actualize I. If after Sod does
that 3 freely chooses A, then the emergent world will Indeed
w. But If (1A) is false, it is just plain not true that
3 would respond in the manner desired if a0d did T, i.e., it
is not the case that were God to do T, world w would result.
As before, if God does something other than T, the ensuing
world is neither w nor w'
,
eo we again have a case where
there is only one course of action that Sod can take, and
that one simply does not seem to work.
So if (14) i 8 true, there is a world that God is unable
to create, even though it is logically possible that that
world be brought about
w
by God. If (14) is false, again
there is a world that God is unable to create even though
it is logically possible that that world be brought about
w
by God. In the one case the world is w and in the other w',
but since (14), like any proposition, can be held to be
either true or false, at least one of (12) or (1^) must be
false, and so must (Ad).
Thus there are true analogs of (A), but none of them
can be of any use where free worlds are concerned. There are
on the other hand, some that are relevant to free worlds, but
none of them is true.
To put plantinga ' s arguments to this point in perspective.
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w« have not been required to modify our notion of omnipotence
beyond
( 5 ), nor have we been asked to drop claims of God's
omnipotence. We have merely had our attention directed
toward the Idea that the application of the view of omnip-
otence indicated by (?) is more perilous than hitherto sup-
posed
,
and that perhaps some atheologians have not accorded
it due respect.
But it was said that Plantings had a defense, and the
foregoing seems to be merely the destruction of a (perhaps
hypothetical) atheological argument. Fair enough, but the
seeds of a defense are there, and Plantinga is quick to
sprout them.
Notice that all the above considerations can be general-
ized and extended to cover any free worlds sharing a maximal
segment, and any creative omnipotent being. We can infer
from that
(15) For any possible omnipotent being, there are
worlds which that being is unable to even weaklybring about, even though the weak bringing
about of any of those worlds by that being is
logically consistent.
Pick any possible omnipotent being whatever, we cannot
reasonably demand of that being the ability to create just any
arbitrary world. It is at least possible that were that being
to actualize the maximal segment of the desired world, the free
creatures of that world would freely proceed in a direction
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engendering a world other than the target world, but whioh
aharee that world's maximal segment. Of course, it may be
that were the maximal segment set up, the free creatures
would perform as their creator wished, and the being would
be able to create^ the world in question. But the truth or
non-truth of that is a' purely contingent matter, and as
argued in an earlier section, no omnipotent being can mahe
that aort of contingency true at will.
The picture we get ia that with reapect to God (or any
omnipotent being), there ia aome set of worlda none of which
lie is m fact able to create, although it ia possible that
He ia able to do so, and under different circumstances He
would be able to, those different circumstances being that
m the various cases the truth values of the subjunctives
corresponding to (14) have different truth values than they
in fact have.
But now consider the set of all those possible worlds
which it is logically possible that God bring about but
w
which as a matter of fact He is not able to. Is it logically
possible that every free world devoid of evil (or perhaps just
every free world better than this one) be within that set?
Intuitively, it would seem so. Every free perfect world, since
it is a free world, is a world that God can at most weakly
actualize, i.e., for which there is some maximal segment
constituting what God can do to bring about that world. For
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each auch world to come about, God must do His part and then
the free peraona involved muat do theirs. But with respect
to each world, it is possibly the case that were God to do
the appropriate creating, the relevant individual would not
uphold their end of the project. And there aeems no reason
to think that not only for each world ia that possible, but
that further it ia possible that for each free perfect world
that ia the case. If it ia, then it ia possible that every
free world not containing evil (or every free world superior
to this one) ia among those that God cannot create. If that
is so, then God can be omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly
good and still create a world containing evil. That is all
that a successful defense need establish. (At a later point,
an argument for an even stronger conclusion will be examined -
namely that even if not every free perfect world were in the
unavailable set, God might still have created this world
without losing claim to any of the traditional properties.)
The operative term in the above ia 'establish'. In what
has just passed, all that was claimed was that there seemed to
be no reason to think that the required eventuality was not
possible. That, of course, does not establish that it is a
possibility, but at this point Plantings provides another
argument, this one designed to do just that - to establish that
( 16 )
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It is possible that every free world not
containing evil i 8 among those that Godthough omnipotent, cannot create.
We now have before us the essence of Plantinga’s
position. According to (15), omnipotence does not rule out
inability to create any member of a certa n set of worlds,
and (16) asserts that there is no logical bar to that set
containing every free perfect world, if the possibility
given by (16) were actual, then God could not create any
of the free perfect worlds, and thus the existence of a
world containing evil would not constitute final proof that
there was no God. In short, if (16) can be made to stand,
the defense can rest.
The argument for (16) is similar in structure to
Plantinga's first argument, but is relativized more to
persons than worlds. As was the case with worlds, creation
of a person is a two-stage affair. God is responsible for
the actualization of some things concerning a person, but the
person must himself determine what things he will freely choose,
and jod cannot control those choices so long as they are to be
free
.
Suppose that God wishes to create perfect world w which
contains possible person 3. In order to obtain that end result,
God must actualize w's maximal segment, which includes, among
other things, the creation of S, the setting up of the situations
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characteristic of w, and the piecing of s in those situations.
God oust then, of course, leave s free to react to finding
himself in those situations in whatever way he freely chooses.
Sinoe that is the case, it is at ieast iogically possible that
were 3 created as part
-of the maxima segment that w stores
with a number of worlds, that s would freeiy choose to do some
evil, with the consequence that the resultant world would not
be w after all, but some other of the worlds having the same
maximal segment.
Now it is at least possible that S would react similarly
to the situation within whioh he found himself were he created
as part of the maximal segment possessed by any free perfect
world whatever. (If s „ere auch( he would be affUcted ^
a mild strain of what Plantinga calls 'transworld depravity'.)
Were that possibility to turn out to be realized, then God would
not be able to create any free perfect world containing s.
The reason parallels what has gone before - were God to pick
a perfect world containing s and to try to create it. He would
have to actualize the maximal segment of that world. But that
involves setting up the situations of that world, creating s,
and leaving s free to react to being in those situations. But
by hypothesis, were God to do that, s would go wrong, and thus
the desired world would not be reached. And again, there is
nothing else that God can do without causing s to cease being
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free. If Ood does anything other than the epecified segment,
some entirely different world would result, so the one thing
that Ood has to do to yield the target world fails - God is
not able to create that world, since the argument is
perfectly general, God cannot then create any free perfect
world containing s. More generally, ood cannot create any
perfect world containing any person who suffers transworld
depravity*
Finally, says Plantings, it is logically possible that
every free possible person suffers this subjunctive malady.
Given that, Ood cannot create any free perfect possible
world at all, even though He is omnipotent, omniscient, and
Wholly good. In short, if the arguments are good, Plantings
has constructed a workable defense.
That completes the somewhat informal introduction to
Plant mga ' a free will defense. To recapitulate, Plantings
points out that the most that we can dermnd of any omnipotent
being, for instance God, i 8 that He be able to bring about
anything which is consistent with its being brought about by
Him* But there are some things which for logical reasons can
be brought about, if at all, only through uncompelled
cooperation of other beings, and if those beings are not
willing, the desired outcome is simply not available. Since
non-cooperation is possible, so is non-creatability. No possible
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omnipotent being can ereate arbitrary free worlds on demand,
so that inability does not count against omnipotence. Further,
there are no interesting restrictions on the makeup of the set’
Of worlds not creatable by any particular possible extent
being, thus it is possible that every perfect world is one of
those on which, given the opportunity, the other depended-
upon beings would refuse to cooperate. Were that possibility
realized, no omnipotent being faced with such stubbornness
oould create a free non-evil world. Thus the existence of
evil is without serious logical ramification for the theist.
Siven now a grasp of the intuitions involved, we can
take a somewhat closer look at Plantinga's arguments. First,
the argument for (15).
Since the argument ia completely general, in order to
aid us in keeping track of what is ultimately at issue, we
will choose Sod as our arbitrary omnipotent being. We will
let „ be a world containing some agent who is free with respect
to some action A
,
and who does the act. We will let w' be a
world sharing a maximal segment
- T - with w, but in which the
act ia not committed. Thus
(17) * (T *A)&^(T—^~A) Def of T and A
Finally, let 'GP' stand for 'God strongly actualizes P'
.
The argument will essentially be this:
(18) (GT > A) v (GT > A) (where 1 >
' is the
subjunctive connective)
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(1 ') (ST > A ) —^ Sod 13 not able to actualize „•
(20) ~(GT > A ) 9>0od la not able to actualize w
cf courae, if either consequent is true, then there will
be some world or other that God is not able to actualize,
but both W and W are .worlds which are logically possibly the
results of God 1 s creating.
Therefore
( 21 ) ( 3»)( (Sod brings about w) & Sod is not abl,to bring about w)
The crucial steps, of course, are found within the
arguments for (19) and (20). Planting^ presentation of
hia argument for (19) runs as follows (my numbering):
[if
(22) GT > A
thenj it is easy to see that God
actualized this world w 1 .
could not have
For suppose He could have,
of affairs o' such that God
actualized O' and such that
actual. That is
Then there is a state
could have strongly
if He had, w' would be
(25) GO' > w'
But w' includes GT; so
(24) GC' > GT
How w 1 either includes or precludes GO'; if the
latter, uC' precludes w 1
. But in view of (2 2>)
GO' does not preclude w' unless, contrary to' ourhypothesis, GO' is impossible. So w 1 includes GO'.
T, furthermore, is the largest state of affairs
God actualizes in w'; T, therefore, includes O'
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GTV--'
n
iH
UdeS
-
aG '* HSnCe the 8tate of affairs
G?>
G
A. “enoe;
8 t0 GT ‘ By (22) f
(25) (GO' & GT) > A
But from (24) and (25) it follows that
(26) GO'.) A
But A precludes w* and hence includes w' ; so
(27) GC > w»
( 25 ) and (27 ), however, are both true only if go’is impossible, in which case God could no( have
affaii^n?
AccordinSly, there is no state of
. ,
8 0 s
^
ch that God could have strongly
8uch that if He had
-
“
As shown in Appendix I, the derivation oan be laid out
formally correctly, without too much trouble. The only
concession that Planting needs is the following plausible-
looking principle:
(2b) (s)(God can actualize* s <-* (3 0)(God can
actualize
s
C & (GO > s))
The argument for (20) shares the spirit of that for (19),
but is a bit more complex. It is
f ^ (
22 ) false, then God could not have
actualized w. For suppose He could have; then(as before) there would be a state of affairs 0
auch that God could have strongly actualized 0and such that, if He had, w would have been
actual. That is
(29) GO > w
Now if (29) is true, then so is either
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(50) (GO & GT) > W
or
(51) (GO & GT) > W
ara r Be lf t22) ia -
30 (unless nj' l8 L os i e rh " in0lUd °3in whic case, eontrnruto the assumption. God enniH + t c a y
but t -i Q iu i
^°Q cou l° n°t have actualized itV
v:?r^vi::Trs aod
however an * •
e
?
OT includes GO. If so,
(??) iVfalst
eqU1VQlent t0 3T. And since
' '
rai e, the same goes for (JO).
And now consider Ml'). i?uu„. nrt . , ,
does not. Suppose it1 includes GT or it
is possible and (?Q
)
i T'
WG h&VQ 8eon
»
if G0
but T iririuH n
* 8 ^ rue
* ^h®0 w includes GO;ncl des 0; so GT includes GO. So if an
22 ie
e8
fa^ ^ 30 "* GT ar ° ^-alentl But
So 00 dofa not • T? 8 ° 18 (29) if GC deludes GT.. es include ST; hence GO & GT is apossible state of affairs. But w includes G'f
hen oe ?
r
.
ltlGiude8 H hence 00 «So GT includes i;(since GO & GT is possible) (Jl) i 8 false.
As is the case in the previous argument, we must grant
Plantings (28). Given that, the derivation seems to proceed
smoothly, and is fully laid out in Appendix II. plantings
continues
iiU’
13 eith3r true or *«•.. Andw ther way, there are poaaible worlds includingHis existence that Sod could not have actualized.
?hat rod
are P° 3“ b
^
»«lds including His existencet G could not have actualized.
T1 18 la8t 18 raerel y Plantings 's way of stating (15) - that
any omnipotent being (e.g., God) there are worlds which
that being ia unable to bring about (weakly) even though the
weak bringing about of that world by that being is logicaiiy
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consistent.
If the above arguments are acceptable, then Plantings
has indeed gone a long way toward achieving hia aim of
demonstrating the viability of the defense, leaving him
only the task: of showing that it is possible that every
free flawless world is one of those within the unavailable
set o
In order to do that, Plantinga introduces the notion of
transworld depravity (TWD) defined as follows:
A person P suffers TWD if and only if for every
worid w such that P is significantly free in w
and P does only what is right in w, there is a
state of affairs T and an action A such that
(1) God strongly actualizes T in w and 1
includes every state of affairs God
strongly actualizes in w
(2) A is morally significant for P in w
and (5) If God had strongly actualized T, P
would have gone wrong with respect •
then goes on
What is important about the idea of transworld
depravity is that if a person suffers from it, thenit was not within God 1 s power to actualize any
world in which that person is significantly free
but does no wrong .... But clearly, it is
possible that everybody suffers from transworld
depravity. If this possibility were actual, then
God could not have created any of the possible
worlds that included the existence and freedom ofjust the persons who do in fact exist, and also
contain moral good but no moral evil.
(In response to the suggestion that God create other
people, Plantinga modifies the above definition slightly to
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it applicable to all possible people, then makes dales
similar to that just quoted. For simplicity, I shall stick
tc the stated definition.)
The arSument that if a person 3 suffers TWO then God
cannot actualize any free flawless world containing s in a
significantly free state follows closely some of the lines
already laid down, and is given in full in Appendix HI.
Again, the major components of the argument are the relevant
definitions and principle (28).
Now that we have in hand both the intuitions and the
formal arguments, what can be said about them? if the
volume of literature called forth is any indication, not
much. There are, to date, not enough articles to strain
a one-handed tabulator - in fact, there are just three, one
of wmch [J] is addressed to points that are not of present
concern.
None of the articles takes serious issue with formal
aspects of Plantinga's arguments, but both William j. Wainwright
[4] and Peter Y. Windt [5] evince some degree of suspicion
over tne state in which Flantinga leaves our view of God's
omnipotence. Wainwright ultimately decides that there are no
unanswerable objections, but Windt is not inclined to be quite
so charitable.
It is perhaps not surprising that th ere should be unease.
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since it no doubt would seem odd to many that an omnipotent
being like 3od should be unable to create certain worlds
even though for any one of those worlds there is no logical
reason for the non-creatability of it, or, as Wainwright
puts it, that there should be
port /Vt
k
w
nd 0f anaSke which is independent ofa d (sod does not determine the limiting facts)and which may prevent Qod from freely realizingni8 desires. °
Of course, oddity per se is not fatal to philosophical
positions, but Windt believes that at least in part the
oddity arises because of an inconsistency in the defense.
He sa ye
Plantinga has claimed that God can be said to be
omnipotent if and only if He can create any state
o affairs, 3
,
such that 'God creates S' is con-
sistent. But the force of the argument under
discussion is to show that, although 'God creates
only morally perfect persons' is consistent,
circumstances might arise in which it would beimpossible for God to create only morally perfect
persons.
The reply, which has been anticipated within the preceeding
pages, is that two senses of 'create' have been conflated.
Plantinga does indeed subscribe to the principle of omnipotence
alluded to when the antecedent 'create' is 'create ' - see
3
(4a) and (4b). His arguments show that the principle with an
antecedent 'create
w
' is false - see (4c) and (4d). When Windt
says that 'God creates only morally perfect persons' is con-
sistent, he is correct only if that is read 'creates '. But in
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order to generate a problem employing that claim
or (Ad) must be appealed to, and they have both
false - Indeed, that can be viewed as the whole
» either (4
been shown
purpose of
c )
Plantings' s first arguments. The charge of internal incon-
sistency, therefore, does not seem well-founded.
But Windt also objects to the defense on other grounds
For instance
*’lantinSa ' s argument to succeed in
t
~od cr a t
d 11 loSlcaHy necessary that
u e es morally perfect persons' is con-
t, ngent, then his argument has the effect ofshowing that an omnipotent being is logicallyimpossible. u ii
I do not actually think that that is an accurate con-
strual of Plantings a aim, but even if it were, we would
not need to live with the result that Windt extracts from it.
suppose that we agreed that any omnipotent being was neces-
sarily able to generate morally perfect persons on demand, and
that Plantinga had just shown us that we oould net demand that
Of any being - that any being who could fill the demand could
do so only contingently. We could either drop claims that
omnipotence was possible, or we could simply concede that we
had not fully grasped our own demand, and then quit demanding
It, just as we no longer require that Sod be able to produce
square circles, windt is here simply proposing that in light
of Plantinga
' a arguments we give up trying to apply the term
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1 omnipotent'
.
damaging.
It is not necesaary to consider that theistically
But is there, despite the failure of specific criticises,
an unacceptable general feature of Plantings'
s position? Is
Vindt right when he says
*
;
• P^ntinga'a argument, if correct, actuallyesta liahea that what God can create is partially
diTin r *
f0rtune
» tb«t] this notion ofme fortune is not compatible with any satis-factory notion of divine omnipotence.
,Vainwright agrees that things look bleak:
* V ^ W?Uld appear that God can do ispartially determined by a set of contingenttacts.
.
. this might appear to be incom-patible with God's omnipotence.
but tends toward the view that only the appearance of
bleakness is involved. He notices that the situations over
win ch God does not have direct control are those involving
free will, where control is ruled out for conceptual reasons.
But of course, nothing in Plantinga's arguments or conclusions
prohibits God from being able to bring about strongly anything
for which it is logically possible that He do so - indeed.
Plantinga insists upon it in the form of (4a) - and that is
perhaps all that it is reasonable to hold out for. Further,
any possible omnipotent being will be under the sort of
contingent limitation now under discussion. That being the
case, it is no indication of non-omnipotence that God also
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operate under that aort of limitation, of course, as Wain-
wright says
beU^rablff^^
'
Hia desires hut
result xn accordance witha , b it is not clear that a beWwmch created a sinless world (of free persons'!wnen placed in these circumstances would deserveto be called
-more skilled' or
-stronger* or
a 'more d ifficuu'taskfItT'ztlt pJ
rftoriBi
“S
favorably situated.
81mply m°re
But Windt will not accept
-simply more favorably sit-
uated- as telling the whole story. He replies
WbUe it is true that Sod would remain as powerful
eva?
ny
+
einS C°Uld be
*
3 neW dimensi°n of comparative
Other
a
bei
n ° f deUieS C°Uld n°W be introduced!
^ I!
§S aS W18e> s°od ’ and P0WerfUl as Godthough subject to the same limitation, still mi^hthave produced a better world, had they been only
Pllnti°
rt
<
nate in thS Choices available to them!a nga's argument, if it is correct, establishes
ut U
V
S ^ ?°d ' S - Ult that we have *°ral evil.
t t°u
8 30 3h°wino that God, although doing
Him y
8 G
'^
ld with the options available to
: T
8
+H
ee
u
fortunate than possible. And
®, I
thlnk
> 13 not compatible with traditional
ways of talking about God's omnipotence.
Of course, Windt' s remarks here amount to a concession
that Plantings has succeeded in what he set out to do - he
has shown that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient,
good being is logically compatable with the existence of evil
.
1
^
- + ?
0t 8eem quite clear what is issue here. Windt
nnw
1
^ i
?°d
.
Can be a9 S°0d as i°gically possible, as
P er as ogically possible, and presumably as knowing aslogicaiiy possible, yet he is still unsatisfied with PlantWsdefense. A clue as to why may be provided in Windt's frequent
loj
conjunction of terms like 'divine fortune' Ui •God's omnipotence', and his suggestion that
6 ora
?
18c;Lence '
>
all the right comparisons.
w e are not making
Plant inga 'd efend s fbeing T*
^ that althou
*h
Tn y good ZiTiT^oand
bv
e
or
P
h
SS le belng3 that °ne might rather have been created
lancing ITs'tZ Ullulle S^nf^ a”’"'
“ WlndVs •»?•«»«* Of Mivinii;r
r
tn2n pertape „ha?e means is that bad fortune does not agree with divinity.
[Us criticisms, then, might be that although Plantinaahas shown that omnipotence, omnieci«ce, omnibenevoience fadbad luck are compatible with evil, he tas not therefore
the candle fo^“h*Vjv,°°Ttible "Uh eVll > and that that lsu or which the theist must ultimately play.
wait unUlT^ I0” U“fh6r Wlndt 13 riSht or not have tontil we get a clearer notion of divinity. In anv casenothing that. he says shows that Plantinga has lost the” battle
from evii
riglnally
^° lned ” a Sainst the historical argument
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chapter IV
Although none of the f„ regolng is evldently deol8ive
againat Plantings, there is perhaps more to he said. pUntinga'a
position and arguments rely heavily upon certain uses of
subjunctive conditional's and possible worlds, and before
attempting further evaluation of his defense we should have
in hand an understanding of just how it is that subjunctives
and worlds have come to be linked.
subjunctives have traditionally been a philosophical
fogbank, but in recent years some of the mist has been dis-
pelled as a result of the work of Robert stalnaker [8] and
David lewis [5J , who have given a number of distinct
(although closely related) possible world semantics for
subjunctives. Plantings opts for a Stalnaker-style
semantics, a skeletal version of which follows.
Let us assume that we can rank possible worlds in order
Of similarity (in various respects determined pragmatically)
to any specific base world. Given an ordering and a base
world, a subjunctive is true in that base world just in case
if in the world nearest the base world in which the antecedent
of the subjunctive is true, the consequent of the subjunctive
is also.
A variety of variations on this theme is possible and,
according to the intuitions of some, desirable. For instance,
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We °“ all°” UOrldS t0 tle in
-*r.. of similarity to the base
world or not. It does seem plausible that a number of dis-
tinct worlds might be equally similar, on some criterion, to
some base world, and if that is the case, since none of the
equally similar worlds' would seem to have greater claim to
relevance in determining the truth value of the subjunctive,
the reasonable thing might be to consider them all, and
assign the subjunctive 'true' only if in all the relevant
equally similar worlds the consequent of the subjunctive
were true.
It has also been thought that this suggestion of
allowing ties should apply to the base. The reason is that
if the antecedent of the subjunctive in question is true in
the base world, then the base world itself is the nearest such
world, so the subjunctive is assigned 'true' just in case
the consequent is also true in the base world. This
generates what might be called 'the TT problem' - that any
two true propositions whatever will, regardless of whether
or not there is the remotest connection between them, be
the antecedent and consequent of a true subjunctive. By
allowing other worlds to tie the base world in similarity to
itself in the relevant respects then granting 'true' under
the conditions specified before, that sort of result can be
avoid ed •
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Of course, worlds can, like anything else, be
-ore or
less similar in various respects, and by emphasizing differ-
ent respects in generating similarity orderings, we can
produce different orderings within any group of worlds.
When we generate an ordering for purposes of evaluating
some subjunctive, we look for worlds which are like the
base world in the desired respects and in which the ante-
cedent of the subjunctive is true, what we ulti,lately try
bo gauge, in terms of the truth value of the consequent.
Is the impact of the truth of the antecedent on a situation
held constant in the relevant respects.
Obviously, if we do not know what the relevant respects
are, evaluation of a subjunctive becomes a fruitless
project. For example, suppose Jones is somewhat of a bird
fancier, and all winter has kept a well stocked bird feeder
which has been visited almost exclusively by chickadees.
Chickadees being dainty eaters, the project has been in-
expensive. Starlings, on the other hand, have notoriously
large appetites and thus we might think that
(1) ,Vere a flock of starlings to begin frequenting
Jones' feeder, his feed bill would rise
But on the other hand, Jones, being an average sort of
bird fan, has a deep loathing of starlings, so if his feeder
began attracting starlings his feed bill would drop to nothing
since he'd rather have no feeder at all than be running a
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8 ta r 1 ing hangou t
.
Thus, evaluation of (1) hlnge8 on what faotora ^ ^
constant. If we hold constant Jones' hitherto followed
policy of keeping the feeder filled, (1) seems true. If „e
hold constant his antipathy for starlings, (1) seems false.
Without some idea of what is being held constant, there is
no point in trying to evaluate (1). We oa„ know what the
semantics for (1) will look like, but we eventually have
to have an ordering, and the semantics does not provide
that - that is something to be determined pragmatically.
In other words, subjunctives are pragmaticall y ambiguous
.
In view of the above, it might appear that evaluating
Flantinga defense will be problematic, since the defense
involves statements like
(2) /Jere God to do T, w' would result
and yet we do not seem to have been given much indication of
what the pragmatic considerations are. Thus we may not be able
to evaluate (2), and if „e can't, how can we evaluate the
d efense ?
But remember that Plantings' a defenae esaentially involves
two claims, (i) that there ia a logical connection between
the truth value of certain subjunctives and what a particular
being can or cannot bring about (Plantings' s version of this
connection is embodied in Chapter III sentence (28)); and (ii)
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that relative to God's ability to bring about a free perfect
world
,
the relevant subjunctives my have exactly the wrong
(from God's viewpoint) truth value. But if Plantinga's
arguments are correct, then if, for instance,
( 2 ) it true,
then God cannot create a perfect T-world, so if (2) is merely
le, then it is possible that God cannot create that
perfect world, and for purposes of a defense, possibility is
all that is needed*
m View of that, it might be tempting to reply that all
that is needed is the possibility that ( 2 ) is true, and that
certainly judge ( 2 ) as to mere logical possibility
Without further agonising. But this suggestion runs into the
immediate difficulty that it makes no more sense than would a
claim that it is possibly true that
^5) He is identical to Jones
(5) expresses different propositions depending upon the
purely pragmatic consideration of what he is involved, without
the pragmatics, we can say what a semantics for ( 5 ) will loom
like
- just as we oouid for ( 2 ) - but we can go no farther.
Perhaps we can, however, push on a bit with (2). There
are some statements evaluation of which involves pragmatic
considerations but which, nevertheless, we can judge to be true
no matter what the pragmatic part turns out to be. For instance
W It is self-identical
no
damanda apaotfication of what 'it- rafara to bafora a full
traatmant can be given, but despite that, we aan be aura
that whatever it turns out to be, (A) will express a true
proposition. Perhaps similarly it might be the ease that
(5) For all orderings 0, (2) is possibly true on 0
We can simplify a bit more. Any subjunctive with
respect to a specific ordering and specified base world is,
if true at that world on that ordering, necessarily true
at that world on that ordering, and if false, necessarily
so. Thus (5) comes to
( 6 ) For all orderings 0, (2) is true on 0
If the claim that (2) is possibly true just comes to
(6), then that claim is simply false, and the response to the
original objection fails.
Perhaps, though, we need not settle on so drastic an
interpretation of the claim. More plausible is the inter-
pretation of it as
(7)
There is an ordering 0 such that (2) is true on 0
(/) seems absolutely true. For instance, in the actual
world (hereinafter •*•), wrongful acts are performed, and in
w' it is also true that wrongful acts - e.g., A - are per
formed, while in w none are. Thus on a similarity ordering
based on whether or not wrongful acts are performed, w' is
obviously nearer o< than is w, and thus (2) can come out true.
Ill
Thus if Plantinga needs only the poa8lbuUy of (a)j ^ , f
that just means ( 7 ), then the repiy seems initialiy successfUi
However, plantings himself may rule out that response
in [7] in his discussion of the notion of ordering. He begins
that discussion saying
xhe required notion of similarity is in many
respects problematic, what does it mean to saythat one possible world is more similar to/than another? In this context is there such athing as similarity uberhaupt, or should wespeak only of similarity in given respects?
He then states that he has 'no time to linger* over that
question and without explicitly giving an answer, proceeds
with his discussion. It seems clear, however, that
Plantings thinks that there are restrictions that must be
placed on orderings, and that not all orderings are
admissible for specific purposes. My reasons for attributing
that general view to Plantinga come out of the following:
Now suppose we consider
[(8)] If Robbins had slipped and fallen at
Thanksgiving Ledge, he would have been
killed
.
No doubt, we are inclined to accept this proposition.
But should we? In the actual world Robbins did not
tall at Thanksgiving Ledge; instead he nimbly climbed
on to it and spent a comfortable night. Now what
happens in the closest world in which he falls? Wellthere is at least one of these - call it W' - in
winch he falls at t just as he is reaching the Ledge;
at the next moment t + 1 (as close as you please to t)
he shows up exactly where he was in °< at t+1; and
everything else goes just as it does in
. Would W*
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not be more similar to the actual world than anvin which he hurtles down to the valley floor thusdepriving American rock climbing of iL retellquent spokesman? And if u u mos eio
[(S)] false? ’
°Uld Ue not rate
Plantinga continues
The answer,. of course, is that we are neglecting
bei^of
°Ur W°rld COnta ^ns a
coLtft + y
are aia0ns it3 mo3t impressive
stituents
... And once we note thftt thegelaws do not hold in W *, so the claim goes, we shallno longer be tempted to thin* it very similar to o<where they do hold. Y 0 °
»
Plantinga is not entirely happy with that reply, for
reasons not at issue at the moment, but as to present appli-
cation he says that *no doubt there is truth in this reply'
.
f/hat Plantinga seems to be saying here is that for pur-
poses of the Robbins case, even though there are orderings
on which (8) is false, these orderings are somehow irrelevant.
There seems to be a distinction being made between orderings
admissible and those inadmissible for that purpose, and
although the criteria are not spelled out, one of them seems
to be whether or not various 'impressive constituents' are
abandoned
.
Presumably, Plantinga will agree that we are faced with
exactly the same sort of situation when we discuss what an
agent can or cannot do. It is, first of all, clear that the
truth values of certain subjunctives are involved in deter-
minations of what someone can or can't weakly bring about.
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For Instance, I can bring it about as a matter of fact, that
my study lamp is on, because I can flip the switch and it is
true in acme relevant respect that
(9) Here I to flip the switch, the lamp would come on
and it makes no difference whatever to my ability that on
infinitely many orderings, that subjunctive is false. Those
orderings, somehow, do not count for this purpose.
Similarly, if my lamp is defective in some way, my
ability to turn the lamp on by flipping the switch is lost,
even though there are still, in that situation, infinitely
many orderings on which (9) is true, somehow, none of those
order ings count.
The point here ia that although subjunctives like (2)
are crucial to what God can or cannot do, not just any
random ordering will support auch an ability statement.
Thus, demonstration that (2) is true on some ordering or
other, or false on some ordering or other does not establish
anything at all about what God can or cannot achieve. The
issue must at this point be narrowed to whether or not
(10) There is an ordering 0 such that 0 is an
admissible ordering and (2) is true on 0
(One more slight modification will come later, but
(10) will serve for the moment.)
Again, we do not yet know what
' admissible' really comes to.
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but we do too, that there must be such a distinction, and
that admissible orderings are those which are capable of
supporting ability or lack of ability statements.
,
of course, open to the atheologian to sit back
and challenge Plantings to establish (10), but the eager
atheologian might go a bit further. He might, for instance,
note that w and w> share T and that T is naximal, and claim
that any further feature outside T that was used as a basis
for an ordering would, given T's maxiaality, entail that s
did A, or entail that S did not do A. Thus, basing an
ordering on anything not contained in T amounts to picking
an ordering based on Ss action - based, in effect, on the
consequent of the conditional. But that sort of ordering,
the atheologian might say, is not an admissible ordering.
In fact, in the Robbins case. Plantings himself rejected
such an ordering. And if the ordering is based upon some-
tnmg internal to T, no ordering of w and w ' results at all,
since both of them comtain T. Thus there is no relevant
respect in which it can be allowed tha c w and w 1 differ,
and thus (2) is not true and hence (10) is false.
Plantings is aware that a fight might develop over
something like this issue, ao he attempts to spike the
opposition guns by arguing that an objection like the fore-
going must ultimately be based upon a common misconception
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concerning ordering. In fact, he thinks that the ^con-
ception is serious enough to threaten the whole current
notion of possible world semantics for subjunctives.
Plantings' s uneasiness grows out of his belief that it is
generally overlooked that 'one measure of similarity
between worlds is whether or not they share their counter-
factuals He thinks that subjunctives cannot be bypassed
in considerations of closeness since, he believes, the
relation between subjunctives and laws is such that differ-
ences in one entail differences in the other, and differences
in laws are generally admitted to be relevant to determinations
of similarity. Although he does not confess himself ready
to junk the popular sorts of world analyses as viciously
circular or uninteresting, it does, he says
truth
f
°^
l0W
^
iat WS Cann0t aa a rule diacover the
value of a counterfactual by asking whetherits consequent holds in those worlds most similarto the actual in which the antecedent holds, for
°h
e
+ 5
eatU " e determininS similarity of worlds is
whether they share their co unter factuals
.
This comes in Plantinga's defense of the claim that in
general either
( n ) A > B
or (12) A > ~ B
Although this issue is a bit removed from the objection
we are considering, Plantinga's remarks, as will be seen shortly.
are relevant.
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Suppose we let * be the (non-*) base world, „ be an
(A 4 B) world, and w’ be an (U» B ) world. Let T be the
initial segment shared by the worlds up to the point where
they diverge. A common sort of objection to the claim that
either (11) or (12) is -true can be stated (as Plantinga
reports it) thus:
There are worlds w and w' that share [t] : these
worlds therefore are equally similar to « in the
reievant respects. Accordingly, neither [(11)1
^ ^
2 ^ is 3Uch it-s consequent is true inthe closest world to * in which its antecedent is;hence, neither [(H)] nor [(12)] is true.
That is, of course, more or less of a restricted version
of the objection currently under discussion. Plantings' s reply:
fi orr, the fact that w and w' share the initial
segment, it does not follow that they are equally
similar to °<
. Suppose [(H)] i 8 true; then w<“does not share that count er factual with and isto that extent less similar to it than w.
The reply does not seem decisive. Both sides agree that
(15) w is nearer <x than w' is or vice versa iff
either (11) or (12) is true
(in general, oi course, (1J) would not be true. For
example, (11) might be true in virtue of w" being the nearest
A world to °c
,
and B being true in it, while w and w' were
tied further away from
. However, the cases in which we are
interested are those in which the antecedent is a maximal
segment shared by (for simplicity) two worlds, (liven that, (1J)
is acceptable.)
H7
Both sides also agree that
(I*) w and w 1 share T
The objector claims that
(15) w and w' share T - is nearer o< than
ia, or vice versa)
Plantinga replies
( 16 )
(17)
(18)
(A > 3) Assume
(A > B ) —
>
(A > B ) —
and w share the subjunctive (A > B )
~ ( <* and w' share the subjunctive
Since w and <* share a subjunctive not held by and since
according to Plantings, that is a nearness^ietermining factor
(19) w is nearer o< than w' is
(Remarks similar to those following (1J) are appropriate
here too.)
Hence
( 20 ) (A > B) —> w is nearer c* than w' is
It is hard to see what, if anything, that argument proves.
(19) would be powerful if standing alone, but it is inside the
scope of an assumption
- (16) - and thus can do no damage.
(20)
,
on the other hand, is free standing, but does not touch
the objection, and the objector might will embrace it.
Of course, if plantings could get (19) alone, the objection
would be shown mistaken. He might get something like that by
showing by similar argument that
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( 21
, (A > /NJ B) w' is nearer or than w is
then by pointing out that the consequents of both (20) and
(21) imply that one of the worlds is nearer than the other,
and by setting up a dilem™, and discharging it using
( 22 ) (A > B) V (A > ro B)
Unfortunately, that would not aeem legitimate, since
the debate is over whether or not subjunctives lihe the two
in (22) are true on an admissible ordering. Andf incidently,
the context within which Plantings presents the above argument
of trying to demonstrate the truth of (22). Using it
would not be legitimate.
But suppose that a dilemma based upon (20), (21), and
(22) is not what Plantings has in mind at all. gun,
whatever he was up to evidently involved (17) and (18),
and they seem open to question. For instance, it is pre-
supposed in (17) that (a > B) is true in w. Although no
explicit reason is given, we are evidently supposed to believe
that on the grounds that A and B are both true in w. But
that is a good reason only if the earlier discussed TT sort
of case does indeed yield truth - i.e., only if non-counter
factual subjunctives are indistinguishable from material
conditionals
- and that position is at the very least not
universally subscribed.
It seems, then, that one response that we might expect
119
Plantmga to give to the objection that „ and must, since
the, share T, be eq uidistant from * 0„ an, admissibie
ordering, will not work..
however, it is not entirely clear that Plantings is as
adly in need of a response as he seems to think. One
reason, which win be discussed later> ^ ^ tf ^
atheologian is right on this point, some easy free will
defenses can be based upon it. Secondly, it need not be
eonceeded that the equidistance from the base world of „
and „ implies that (22) is false, since there have been
offered semantics within which that implication does not
hold, one semantics which does just that by employing
^valuations, has been discussed by David Lewis [5] (p . 81) .
Lewis' suggestion can be slightly modified to fit into a
Stalnaker-type model in the following way: suppose that we
aluating some formula on some ordering, and that we
are looking for the P-„orld nearest the base world. As it
happens, there is a tie among a number of p-worlds for nearest.
Siven that tie, we could construct a number of artificial
orderings parasitic on the given ordering in that they mirrored
the original ordering up to the tie worlds, then ordered the
tie worlds in the various logically possible ways. Thus if
there were three P-worlds tied for nearest on the original
ordering, we could produce six of these second generation
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orderings. It i. here that the supervaluations con* in. In
this system we grant the formula the truth value 'true' on
the original ordering only if that formula comes out true in
the usual way on each of the secondary orderings.
In the case of (22) that would work as follows. Let
us assume that w and „' are the only relevant worlds and
that, as the atheologian would have it, they are tied in
similarity to on the admissible ordering. We can now
construct two second generation orderings having no ties.
Both reflect the admissible ordering up to the tie, then
one of them places w ahead of w', while the other places
bef° re W- 0n the flr8t
-
(A > B) is true, and thus by
addition so is (22). Qn the secorai, (A > ~ B ) is true,
and again by addition, so is (22). 3ince (22) is true on
botr. orderings, it is then true on the original ordering.
Notice, however, that (A > B) is not true on the original
ordering, nor is (A > ~ B ) * Still, the semantics provides
a way for allowing the tie the atheologian is pushing, while
allowing Plantings to hang on to (22). Thus, if this is an
acceptable semantics. Plantings need merely adopt it and deny
the opponents claim that the asserted tie robs him of (22).
However, Plantinga makes some remarks which seem to
indicate that he would not be willing to buy (22) at the cost
of giving up both disjuncts individually, as the above method
121
would require. In discussing whether a
have accepted a bribe given the chance,
•
. . there is something [he]
that state of affairs obtained
specific agent would
Plantinga says
would have done, had
We can all agree that had it obtained, the agent would
have done something or other, but Planting. says that there
is some response R such that had the situation obtained, R
would have been the agent's response. In an attempt to
convince us that there is some such response R, Plantinga
asks: would an omniscient being know what the agent would
have done? and answers his own question 'yes'. If it is
known what he would have done, there is, of course, some
thing he would have done. That is tantamount to claiming that
at least one of the disjuncts of the relevant (22)-type
disjunct is true.
But it is not obvious that Plantinga is right in his
specific claim. It is surely the case that
Had A been the case, God would have known the result
it does not follow from that plus God's omniscience that
God knows what would have been the result had A been the case.
Granted, an omniscient being knows all the facts of the matter
and, under different circumstances, would have known all the
facts - and there would have been such - of that matter. But we
since A is not the case now.
have as yet no reason for thinking.O J
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that there are here and now facts of the matter concerning
facts of what would have been the matter. But if there are
none such, then not even an omniscient being will Know -
there are simply „0 relevant true propositions to Know.
Consider a case wherein
(2-4) (A > B)
and (25) ^ (A > ^ 3 )
how consider the nearest A -world. Either B is or is not
going to be the case there, and Sod
,
being prescient, would,
in that world, know which, i.e.,
(2^) Were A the case, God would Know what was going
to happen relative to 8
Suppose that A is not the case. God can know that had
A happened either B or not-B would have, but He cannot know
WhlGh
,
f° r if He did ^ow that, say, 3 would have, then (24)
is, contrary to the assumption, false. The same goes for
not-B and (25). So unless A is actually going to obtain or
already does (allowing God to know regarding 3 by virtue of
foreknowledge alone) there is simply nothing for God to know.
Thus if (24) and (25) are true, it is not the case that God
or anyone else knows what would have happened.
Plantinga, of course, wants to maintain that God does
know, if so, then either (24) or (25) is false, but (24)
and (25) are not shown incompatible unless it is established
that necessarily God knows what would have happened, perhaps
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Plantings holds that, but it is not clear that he does, and
he does not argue for it.
Sr, far, the difficulty over Plantinga'e subjunctives has
involved only the fact that the antecedents are maximal, and
that that may raise problems concerning their truth-values.
But the subjunctives that Plantinga wishes to use also all
involve propositions related to free will and choices in
their consequents, eg
(27) Were 3od to do I, 3 would freely choose A
and that could perhaps become another point of attach for the
atheologian.
First of all, it could be maintained that any subjunctive
of the form (A > 3) ls false if there is no real connection
between the antecedent and consequent. Consider
iZusiiiz:. blue shirt toTO™’ the n—
There being absolutely no discernable connection between
antecedent and consequent, the statement might reasonably be
held to be false.
Similarly, it might be alledged that if s's choice con-
earning A is really free, Cod ' s actions in setting the stage
so that 3 can freely choose is relevant only to whether or not
S is faced with a choice and has nothing to do with what S
freely chooses, if that is right, then any subjunctive like
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(27) in containing a choice
(except trivial cases - eg.,
are identical) must be false
statement in the consequent
where antecedent and consequent
Or the atheologian could cite Flantinga's claims that
A 8 a iient feature of £cauaalthey are said to support or
laws.]
entail
and later that
is that
. . .
counterfactual 8
that
counter factuals
.
These two passages come in support of Flantinga's claim
• • • the relationship between causal laws andcounter factuals
. .
. is both intl.te a^d notorious.
cn Flantinga's view, what subjunctives are true in a world
ie at the very least to a significant extent tied to the causal
laws of that world. Flantinga's example of a causal law is that
which supports (8); If Robbins had slipped and fallen at
rha.if.sgiving Leage, he would have been killed. But if there
is some causal law of that type linking Ood • s actions to s's
choice, what might it mean to say that that choice is freel
And if there is no such law, since subjunctives evidently
require some sort of support, what supports e.g., (27)
?
The
atheologian might argue that the prudent move is to give up
claims that significant free will subjunctives can be true.
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Charge and countercharge could continue, but suppose ..
shortcut the process by seeing what would happen were Plantinga
to yield the field to the atheologian by admitting that
subjunctives like (27) never came out true on any admissible
ordering. It might seem at first glance that Plantinga-
s
defense would sustain no damage, since Plantinga ultimately
abandons (22) in favor of the weakeron and more plausible claim
that in general
(2
' ) (A > B) v rj (A > 8)
and that is surely true regardless of the nature of A, the
nature of B, and the nature of the ordering. Thus if the
rest of his defense holds up, he will be successful as long
as he contents himself with (28) rather than appeal as well
to, say, (22).
But that response won't work. The reason is that the
argument involving transworld depravity employs - as part of
the i\iD definition - a subjunctive of the form
(29) Were Sod to actualize the maximal segment ofperfect world w, s would go wrong relative to A
and it is essential that that subjunctive can be true. Thus if
the atheologian wins the current battle, Plantinga' s defense
appears mortally wounded
.
1
,
1
!
1
:frga . COUld recon8truct the TWD definition to contain onlvnegated subjunctives, but that leads to further difficulties inconnection with Chapter III sentence (28).
l 1^88
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That should not bother Planting, though, because there
la another defenae very like his that now see™ like it will
work. It is being claimed, remember, that anything line
(27) Were Sod to do T, S would freely choose A
“8t be fal3e °" any aPP™P-ste ordering, either because the
antecedent involves maximality in the previously specified
»ay, or because the consequent involves a choice. Now
although we do not yet know exactly what the connection is.
It is evident that, as discussed earlier, there is a connection
between what can be brought about and what subjunctives are
recycle the earlier example, I can bring it about
as a matter of fact that my study lamp is on, because I can
flip the switch, ana it is true in some relevant sense that
were I to flip the switch it would come on. and it somehow
makes absolutely no difference to my being able to bring that
about that on infinitely many orderings that subjunctive
comes out false. Or if there is a snort in the lamp, my
ability to make it come on by flipping the switch ia lost even
though there are any number of orderings on which it is false
that were I to flip the switch nothing would happen, because on
some ordering that somehow counts, were I to flip the switch
nothing would happen. Thus certain subjunctives and certain
orderings are important. But suppose the atheologian is right
and that on all the important (admissible) orderings, (27 ) and
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everything resembling it ha a + ~s to come out false. Then
(JO) Were and to do T, w would result
must be false, if (30) were tru»'
’
then Slnce in w 5 chooses
A, ( 27 ) would also be true, similarly
(jl) Were 3od to do T, W would result
-at also be false, since otherwise given that in
,
chooses not-A, it would follow that
( 52 ) Were God to do T <3 u » ,a T, S would freely choose not-A
and on the present view (J2) must be false on all acceptable
orderings also, since it resembles (27) ln the requisite
respects
.
Thus if subjunctives like (50) and (Jl) must be false,
then there are no true subjunctives indicating results of
specific maximal segment creative acts by Qod
. That being so,
Sod of course cannot know what the results would be. There is
no true proposition for Him to know. Once He has actualized
some maximal segment, then He will foreknow what is going to
happen - see (2o) - but that is of no help to the atheologian. 1
It will do no good to Claim that
(55) re God to do T, then He would foreknow thate*g., A was going to happen
reiSus^in^^fao'rrT ST* H ® *111 in ** *>. and what the
to the actual L!Ll a;.me
e
nr°
W
l
a
t
U fa0ta relative
atlon of alternative 0»tC L “T 8 ° me Precrea tive consider-
would not be available^
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since that entails ( 27 ) whir>h Q ™-
-
, again, is supposed to be false.
Omniscience is generally he id to be lmowl9dge of aU
true propositions, and omniscience usually figures in to
results of His creating some maxi„l segment would be, or
fecws what some agent would do if created. But if the op-
position is right on the issue at hand, a being can be cm-
mscient and know none of that - indeed no h •-na , being can know
any of that. 1
Thus 30d could be omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly
good, yet have to choose some creative act over another
without being sure of the outcome of either, for the simple
reason that there is no outcome such that it would result
from the appropriate creative act.2 Given that, it is not
“7( ?TthatioYrn -be nothing like (50') or fnr . ' 22 )> there still will
since on that seL^i s A\ )“ u">that either (a > B ) or (a > ~ B) is tru7. ”
tJe
e
a
r
biUtv ST!1 d 1iffiouUy in granting an omniscient being
wo!ld alwavs h
Ch° 1Cee
- The Pr° blam 18 »uch a being
weri g^3W"s^^ JT&fS1“
TsZX rh actlon ^
iSs*™ i.f.
cannot be held ?f
J°d had n° oholoe in His actions, He surely
morally responsible for their results, of course"
,1* ’ hS
“ “iSht th8n °harse that 3od i3 •><* good, since
’
claim ?hatod
S
had
a
?i
be
K
S
°r
d
’
bUt the theist °°uld 8ti11 Perhapsthat uod the best possible character, where 'character'
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clear what the existence of evil is supposed to count against,
in fact, „e might even be able to make a case for Bod not
being moral unless He chose not to try for a perfect world
at an. suppose that Bod's two most likely-looking maxi„l
segment options were T- and T«
,
and that T' would result in
either world a or world b, and I" would result in either
world o or world d. Suppose farther that a is perfect but
b unspeakable, while c and d are both in the middle. It
might be immoral for Bod to take a chance on a, thereby
risking getting b, when by doing T" He would at least guar-
antee that the evil in whatever world resulted would not go
beyond some reasonable limit. Additionally, some game theorists
would tell us that the rational choice in this case is T",
whereas choosing T' would be irrational. Surely we could not
fault God for being rational and choosing T"
.
Besides that, if Plantings'
s principle (28) (Shapter HI)
(S)(God can actualize,, s (3 C)(God can actualize 0 4
(SO > 5)))
is sound, and if the contained subjunctive is an instance of
(27), then since on the present view there will be no such true
is defined subjunctively. However, since virtually all nro-
th^threat to^od"
?
““"d
^ ocnoerned bo show ?hat® thre uod s goodness emerges from the choices He h*«
Zfln.T r ?re 8Vi,r ly preparsd t0 bor,:ed°e
0
c?:ice to
a
her
’
thi9 llne wlU be pursued. For farther dis-cussion of some general considerations surrounding choice andpreknowing, see Carl ainet [2 ] .
b
subjunctive, the atheologically essentia! claim that God
Could have actualized a free perfect world win si,„ply be
falsa. Without disputing the above principle, the athec-
logian simply cannot have u both W£>ya _ that
subjunctives are all fa l8e and that God could have guaranteed
a free perfect world. But either way he goes, his case
seems to founder.
Of course, Plantinga's principle may not be sound, and
the case involving T . and T . may not ultlmUly stand ^
but it is clear from God's ensuing epistemological position
alone that if Plantinga's opponent prevails on the present
point of contention concerning the truthvalues of (27)-
type subjunctives, he does so oh pain of incurring Plantinga's
gratitude.
The situation can be described in the following way.
Suppose Hod is deliberating concerning actualizing T or not.
If He does, either w or w* will result, so He is considering
e.g., the statement that
0^) Were He to do T, w' would result
He mows that (j4) is true on some orderings, false on
others. Now when we want to distinguish worlds as far as
similarity to a base world, we do so in terras of various re-
spects ci similarity. What this amounts to in cases involvin
two worlds is that we fasten upon some proposition 0 which we
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want held constant and than examine the two alternative worlds
to see in which of the two 0 in fact holds and tag that one
as the nearer of the two.
Aa was discussed earlier, subjunctives like (J4) are
crucial to God's being able to bring about certain results.
If Ha can bring about w' it is because He can do T and (}4)
ia true - not just on any ordering, but on one somehow
important ordering which distinguishes w and in simi-
larity. Behind that ordering is some feature 0, the holding
constant of which goes into generating that ordering, jjow
if God brings about employing His ability to do so which
la supported by the truth of ( 54) on the ordering the
relevant part of which is generated relative to the holding
constant of 0, then 0 .mist in fact be true. But 0 is either
wholly in T or it is not. If it is, since w and both
contain 0, 0 cannot generate an ordering placing w and w' at
different levels of similarity from the base. If it is not
wholly within T, it is possible for the ordering it generates
to distinguish between w and w' in similarity to the base,
but then, being not completely within T, it cannot as a part
of w or w' be made true by God.
5° if (54) is true on an ordering which will support an
ability statement to the effect that God can bring about w',
that ordering must be based upon some non-T factor 0 and if
1^2
that ability is to be employed by Sod, 0 rust in fact obtain.
But Sod cannot be behind o', obtaining
- since 0 is not wholly
within T, Hie being so would violate the strictures on T and
w and w'
.
Now if Sod actualizes T either w or w
'
there some factor which holds in the general
will result. la
scheme of things
which (although it cannot be controlled by God, being outside
T) will, upon Bod 1 s creating, push one of the two worlds
into actuality over the other? In short, is there some 'real'
ordering of worlds upon which e.g., (JO) or (Jl) is true and
which will be effective if Sod actualizes T? If the answer
ia 'no', then Sod cannot know the results of specific arbitrary
creative acts and the existence of evil is not decisive. If
the answer is yes', then Plantinga's opponent has lost the
immediate battle.
Again, when God is considering creating, He wants to
*n°w wnat the result of creating T will be. Either there is a
specific answer or else the answer is - it depends upon what
other things are held constant in fact. But God, if He is
doing f, cannot hold anything else constant in fact - i.e.,
He cannot support the truth of anything else - without thereby
ceasing to do T. Now either there is an answer concerning
what would happen were He to do T without holding anything
constant, or there is not. If there is one, Plantings has his
155
Point. If there is none, the atheologian has lost on the
entire issue.
Let us then, out of charity to the atheologian declare
him the loser of this last battle, concede Plantings whatever
point it is he wants here, and continue. At the very least,
what Plantings wants is that subjunctives like (50) and ( 51 )
can be true on some ordering which - unlike some other
orderings
- allows them to be relevant to discussions concerning
results that God might get as outcomes of various creative acts.
Along with most present-day philosophers, Plantings
accepts the view that subjunctives are modal and world
relative - that is, only with respect to some world or other
can a subjunctive be assigned a truth value, since two of
Plantinga
'
s major tools - Principle (28) (Chapter III) and
the TWD definition - contain subjunctives, it is only natural
that we ask what world it is that those subjunctives are true
relative to. The answer (which Plantings gives in [6 ] p. 48)
is that they are 'to be true in fact, in the actual world 1
.
Given that, the following sort of objection beckons, if
the subjunctives are analyzed relative to this world (call
it <* again) then if, for instance, S suffers TWD, it is true
in this world that had God actualized the maximal segment of
perfect world w (say, T), S would have performed some wron^
action. But of what relevance could that have been to Sod's
original ability to createT Let us for the accent lapse into
a temporal mode of discourse and consider the situation prior
to Sod's doing any creating at all, and picture Sod as looking
over the whole panoply of possible worlds as a prelude to
choosing one to bring about. A number of facts confront Sod.
There are, He sees, two worlds - „ and w' - which share
maxima, segment T, and w is the more desirable of the two.
There is also some third world, <*, that does not contain T
but in which it is true that were He to do T, w' would result.
But there is, additionally, a fourth world, p, and in p it
is true that were He to do T, w would result, of course,
none of those four worlds is yet actual, since the envisioned
scene is precreative, but somehow, if Plantinga's arguments
are correct, the truth-in-« of one subjunctive precludes
God from creating w, even though the truth-in- (3 0 f the other
evidently does not bar God from creating w '
.
What relevant difference could account for that disparity?
Cne fact we now have is that did become actual, but that might
not seem enough. Had Sod actualized T, either w or w' would
have been actual, and c* would not, never would have been, and
never would have been going to be actual. Yet the truth of the
specified subjunctive in c* is supposed to have some relevance
to what God could have done even had He been going to do differ-
1^5
ently than He in fact did.
To tame a parallel case, suppose that ^
, , mximal
not a world » in whloh it ls true^ had ^ ^ ^ ^
(distinct from « but sharing M) would have resulted. Thus
by an apparently parallel argument, in » it ls the oaBe that
G°d °0Uld n0t h8Ve Created *
> J<*t as in <* it is the case
that God could not have created w. yet God did create *,
(at least, o< 19 actual) so the precreative truth in i
'
of
« 'a uncreatability was evidently an interesting feature
of K
,
but had no particular force. So why was not the
precreative truth in « 0 f the uncreatability of „ merely
an interesting feature of o< ?
It might again be replied that as a matter of fact <*
became actual, so w's uncreatability became actually true
rather than simply true-in-«. But that response will not do.
Nothing Stopped God from creating X, and were JC actual it
would be actually true now that o< was uncreatable rather than
just true-in- )
. But it is easy to see that that truth could
not have stopped God from originally tawing the course which
He in fact took - creating <*. That God could have taken
that course is shown by the fact that He did. from that it
would appear that the current truth of w's uncreatability is
really irrelevant to what God could have done had He chosen
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differently than He did. The actual truth of w's unoreat-
ability is merely an interesting aide effect of the decision
to actualize «, rather than a factor that had to be taken
into account in making any such decision.
we can get a slightly different angle on this same
objection if we switch into world talk. Although as noted
earlier Plantings experiences some unease over possible
world semantics for subjunctives, for purposes of discussion
he does accept what was earlier called a skeletal view of the
Stalnaker-type semantics, Given this provisional acceptance
of world analysis, that subjunctives are world relative and
rnodal, and that the base world for Plantinga's subjunctives
is the actual world, that 3 would go wrong were 3od to do T
translates to something like
(55) In the nearest world to in which Goddoes T, 3 goes wrong
What that tells ua is that if we begin at * and proceed
along the ordering, the fir<?t T-unrin + 1 +world that we come upon will
be w'. If we continue on, we eventually get to w, but the
truth of ( 55) guarantees that w' is between o< and w, and that
we cannot traverse the ordering from to w without going
through w
. in short, without walking through the Valley of
Death (W) you simply can't get there (w) from here (o<).
Plantinga argues that if ( 55 ) is true, then w is unbeat-
able by God
. Admittedly, 3od does not want to get stuck with
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w, and there is nothing that He oan do to ensure w over
but since what leads to the problem is His starting from
hare (<*), the previous question can be rephrased; why should
He start from here to begin with?
doubt Plantings 1 s response would begin with the charge
that we have been misled by traditional locutions about God
creating worlds, since we cannot very reasonably demand that
God actualize Himself (as Plantings points out), talk of God
creating worlds has naturally led to a tacit conceptual
removal of God from within the structure of possible worlds.
(In fact, the present objection was partially motivated by
talk of God sitting back and looking over various possible
worlds precreatively
- when none were actual.)
But that aort of move leaves us without any way of
handling contingent propositions about God, and Plantings
plainly thinks that there are such. Thus, whatever it is
that God actualizes, it is not full-blown worlds, since He
Himself is part of them. 30 just as we humans originally
find ourselves in a situation not of our choosing at birth,
and what we can do about it depends in part upon our powers
and the sorts of results our actions engender, God, says
Plantings in effect, finds Himself situated in a manner not
ontirely of His choosing, and what He can do about it also
depends in part upon His powers and the sorts of results His
1J8
actions will elicit - i.e., upon what subjunctives are true
relative to that base, of course, God's powers are not non-
loglcally limited as ours are - what it is logically possible
that He strongly bring about. He can - but there are certain
subjunctives that He is subject to, and there are consequent
limits on the results He can (even weakly) achieve. Just
which subjunctives are true is a matter tied uP with just
which world it is in which we all found ourselves.
So now we see why we cannot demand of God that He have
created out of a different context than He did, and the
purported objection fails. We can perhaps also see a bit
further into the earlier question of why some orderings are
important to abilities and some not. Consider
(-0 //ere 3 to do A
, B would result
and assume that S can do A, and that A is S's only possible
action relevant to B. We ask - can 3 bring about B?
Plantings
' s answer seems to be that if (i) is true he can, and
if (i) is false he cannot. But remember that anything like
(i) is ambiguous, and we have to know what is being held
constant and only then can we investigate what impact the
truth of the antecedent will have on the truth value of the
consequent.
Suppose that ordering 0 involves holding constant C, and
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Hq "t# on 0 ( x ^ 1 q ^ » .» , .k ) true. We oan then eay that lf o obta . na
and 3 does A, B will result. Suppose that O' involves
holding constant O' and that on O' (i) is false. On
Plantinga view, if o' obtains and 3 does A, B will not
result
.
Thus in order for 3 to be able to bring about B, (i)
muat be true on 0 and C must in fact obtain. In the case of
(50) Were God to do T, w would result
we have a parallel setup. In order for God to be able to
bring about w, there must be an admissible 0" involving a
O'1 on which ( 50 ) i s true, and in the world in which God
finds himself, 0" must in actual fact, apart from anything
God does, be true. It is this whole idea which is, I think,
behind Plantinga' s apparent suspicion that we do not get to
pick an arbitrary ordering when considering various sub-
junctives in various contexts.
This is not to say that if (JO) is true on ordering 0"
then
(50a) (God does T & 0" obtains)
—^ w results
lln Seneral » there is no one proposition that is held constant
in an ordering. Rather there is a fUzzy set of propositions,
members of which are peeled off as we progress away from thebase world. However, between any two worlds the situation canbe regarded as a case of one (no doubt complex ) proposition beinrdecisive in virtue of holding in one world and not the other.Since the cases of ultimate interest here are basically two-
world cases (e.g., w and w'), the difficulties with longer
orderings will be bypassed.
14o
but only that if the truth of (50) on orderlns 0 „ i0 uhat
supports 3od's ability to bring about w
,
then at th#^
God cannot in fast bring about w unless 0" obtains. But
of course, if 0» is part of T, then it does not provide the
basis for an ordering separating w and w' (which share T)
and we again have „ arid tied on the important ordering,
the consequences of which have already been discussed. And
if 3" is not completely within T, then it is, by hypotheses,
not totally under God's control.
So (JO) is either true or false depending upon what
ordering we pick. But each ordering involves the holding
constant of some unique factor or other, such a factor -
bemg outside T - 13 outside God's control, and just which
order-generating factor actually obtains is a contingent
matter
.
This, of course, is another place where Flantinga's
pointing out that God is within a world comes in. Within
any world, some factor will obtain and others will not, and
if such factors are contingencies, there are worlds in which
the factor holding in those worlds is one relevant to the
crucial ordering for (JO) - and thus only in those worlds can
it be true that God brings about w - and there are worlds in
which the relevant factors are ones not relevant to the
crucial ordering - and in those worlds it is false that God
could have brought about w. But God finds Himself in some
I4l
particular world, and the determining factor relative to (JO)
is one not under Hie control, but ie, aince the world la
actual
,
held constant In fact, and thua whether or not it la
true in fact that He could have chosen to bring about „ is
not under His control 'and never was.
However, farther difficulties seem to arise involving
choices and the placing of Sod within a world, when we say
that S could choose either to do or to not do some action A,
what do we mean, We obviously cannot mean just that there is
a world in which S does A and one in wnlch he does not do A.
We might mean something to the effect that s can either make
it the case that the actual world is a non-A world, or make
it the case that the actual world is an A-world. of course,
that does not mean that 3 could .sake it the case that is an
A-world, or a non-A world, since whether or not <* is an A-
world is a matter of necessity, and S certainly does not deter-
mine necessities. Does it mean, then, that 3 could determine
wbother or not i 9 a c tua 1 ? t n + n
n
l 7 Intuitions concerning that are a
bit difficult to harness. If is an A-world. we want to say
that S could have refrained from A, and that that he did not
is part of what made it the case that =< is actual rather than,
say, But when could 3's choice of A, or the fact that 3
was going to do A have exerted any pressure in determining
that the one world was actual rather than the other? We can't
have facta running around loose outside worlds, yet once the
been the actual world. There has never been a time when it
was not, and thue just how choicea determine actuality is
a bit unclear. Although this line looks perilously close to
the modal error of arguing that 3 could not have done other
than he did since that he would do A was always true, it is
not being suggested that S' a doing A does not figure into a
determination that « is actua! - it does - but only that it
is a bit hard to visualize the mechanics of that admitted
determination.
Fuzzy as our intuitions may be on this point, it still
might seem that if the difficulty of where Sod starts from is
to be sidestepped by appealing to the eternal actuality of a
particular world which restrains God to some extent, we have
to be exceedingly careful in trying at the same time to
salvage the meaningfulness of choice by claiming that in some
y choices which will oe made (by God, too) predetermine which
world it is that has been eternally actual. Depending upon
exactly how the salvage operation goes, the atheologian might
be able to come back and ask why God was not such that He was
going to choose in such a way that those choices would pre-
ordain an eternally existing situation from which He could and
would choose and act with the results that Plantings claims
14}
that He perhaps cannot get.
To begin our exploration of the interrelationship between
oho and worlds, let us note an interesting feature of
structures. In setting up such systems we allow ourselves
a eupply of atomic sentences which can then be evaluated at
world
-times, such sentences, being simple and atomic, have
no interesting entailments for times other than those at
which they are evaluated true except that if P i 8 evaluated
true at <w,t>
,
then for all f, that P is true at <w,t> is
at <w,t >
. Suppose we pick some arbitrary world w and
time t and consider the set 5 of all the atomic sentences P
such that for each of them there is some t' prior to t such
that P is evaluated true at <w,f>
. since the members of
that set do not, either singly or in chorus, entail the
truth of any atomics at times subsequent to t, there is no
particular set S' such that S' is composed of atomic
sentences evaluated true at various t» subsequent to t, and
such that S' is the only such set for which the deductive
closure of S U S' is maximally consistent. In short, there
can be more than one world which up to some point t has a
particular set of atomics evaluated at various times true
in it. If for the moment we consider a world to be (or at
I believe that something like this idea was behind some brief
remarks by David Kaplan in [j] (p. 1}1) about worlds that
overlap'. Baruch A. 3rody [l] has made similar remarks.
ieast be associated with) such a really consistent set
generated from atomics, then the view that we get is of a
number of worlds paralleling each other up to point t, after
which they go their separate ways, if „e were to give a
linear representation against time of all such possible
worlds which share a common history to point t, we would
have a collection of lines all running parallel up to point
*' then b6£lnnlns t0 fa" °ut “ representation of different
possible futures from t.
het us in fact adopt this visualization, and call any
such structure a tree. The trunk extends to point t, and is
composed of the paralleling parts of the relevant worlds. At
t, the worlds begin to diverge, going off in different
directions, each ultimately emerging as a separate branch of
the tree.
There might be those who even at this early point would
register protests, it might be ctarged, for instance, that no
such structure could be generated from atomic sentences, since
we simply do not have enough sentences. If we are talking
about characterizing worlds with atomic sentences, „e will have
to have indenumerably many such sentences, and that demand
puts rather more strain on a language than any can bear.
The point is well enough taken, but tells against trees
in no particular way in which it does not also tell against the
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usual modal and temporal logics. All such systems more or
less tacitly presume the fiction that the requisite sentences
are available, and for present purposes this traditional
fiction will be adopted. (If it becomes ultimately untenable,
however, we can employ Humean events (of which we can allow
ourselves all „e want), and construct trees by mapping
possible courses of events staring common histories.)
It might also be objected that we cannot ao blithely
associate sets such as the closure of 5 U S' with individual
worlds since that closure would contain only simple and com-
pies truth functional statements, but would not contain
modal statements - for instance, subjunctives - which are
important constituents of worlds. Thus, any such set could
at best be associated with some set of worlds. That
objection, however, seems to presuppose that we can have two
worlds wnich differ only in subjunctives (and trivial
entailments of those subjunctives) and it is not at all obvious
that that's right. The intuition behind such a claim might
be something like this: subjunctives are odd in that they do
not seem to exert any real force within a world just as (some
have claimed) causality does not. We can check up on ante-
cedents, consequents, and parallels between similar cases, and
in some instances determine falsehood, but we cannot within a
world really pin down subjunctives. Possible world analyses
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to some extent emphasizes this by employing only material
cond itionala within worlds, and by placing all the real
weight on an extra-worldly feature - ordering. But if we
really do have to appeal to ordering, then nothing strictly
Internal to a world entails the relevant subjunctives in
that world, and thus two worlds could differ only In sub-
junctives
.
A possible response is that world structure is in fact
rigid, and that if e.g.
f w is closer to w' on ordering 0 than
33 w«, it is necessarily closer, since otherwise, the
ordering would not be the one specified. Thus within any
world it is true that the set of propositions defining w is,
on criterion 0, nearer the set defining w' than that deter-
mining w", and that is something derivable within any world -
being a purely logical matter. Thus, subjunctives are an
entirely intra-world matter, and it is not necessary that we
line up and pace off a bunch of worlds, although that is
perhaps intuitively helpful.
1
There are a number of mechanisms that could be cited as
giving rise to forks in a tree, but we may be able to simplify
a bit by interpreting all forks as being representative of
With some modification, the discussion in this and the pre
ceeding paragraph can be extended to all modal statements.
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choices. For instance, if a sunspot erupts at some time t,
it does so only because Qod chose to actualize some maximal
segment containing that occurrence. Thus, forks encountered
within a tree, no matter what sort of event or atomic sen-
tence they correspond with, can be construed as choices,
either human or God's.
To interpret a tree, let us view ourselves as members of
an expedition moving in the time axis direction within a
tree. At every for* we come to, whoever it is whose choice
that fork represents must step up and pick a branch - to
choose is just to direct the expedition at specified forks.
Actual history will be just the path that has been followed
to the present
- just that path which has been determined
by the actual choices of all agents, God included. The real
world will turn out to be the world associated with whatever
path it is over which all choices which have been made, and
which ever will be made, will go together to direct the
expedition.
It is here that the puzzle concerning the mixing of
choices and worlds roust be confronted. Intuitively, since
some particular world (<*) has always been actual - i.e.,
since our expedition has always been marching along on the
path - and since we do not seem to be able to now bring
it about that in fact (3 has always been actual - i.e., since
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our expedition can't go leapfrogging from path to path -
it look. SB though either we are locked Into thia partic-
ular path or else what we do now somehow contributed to
our always having been on thia path. For 3 to do other
than, say, A, would be for all of ua to have always been
on a different path, for ua to have done everything done
up to t as part of a different world than this one. Thus
even within the trunk of a treo, we are walled off from the
other to-that-point-id entical worlds.
An alluring intuition is that had S been going to do
non-A, then everything bacic to forever would have, being
all part of a different world, been subtly different than
it is. That, however, simply need not be the case in any
modal theory except counterpart theory (and that that is
the case in counterpart theory has been at the bottom of
some criticisms of the theory - see e.g., Saul Kripke W ).
Let us consider a parallel case. Suppose a building is
under construction. The cornerstone has been laid, but the
builders have yet to decide at that point, whether to stop
at ten floors or to go for twenty. They decide upon ten.
It turns out, then, that the cornerstone has always been going
to be in the foundation of a ten story building. But suppose
they had gone for twenty. Then it would have been the case
that the cornerstone had always been going to be in the found-
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ation of a twenty atony building. But that does not Imply
that had they gone twenty, the cornerstone would have all
along been a different stone than the one In fact used.
There would be a complex property that the stone would have in
one case - being In the foundation of a ten floor building -
that it did not have in the other, but that it has it is
merely a trivial result of the fact that the building
stopped at ten. That property is simply a logical glue-
on, What S.E. Moore would have called 'purely external'.
The stone is exactly the same stone in both cases.
Wow consider some time f prior to t, and act 0 such
that s does Sit t 1
. Suppose also that in ot and (3 s
does 0 at t', but that S does HUM, and not-A at
t in (?, and that those are the only relevant acts in those
worlds, so that
( ii ) S does A at t —*> ( t' )( o< is actual at t 1 )
So if 3 does A at t, so that c* lias always been actual,
we could say that S did 3 at f as part of <*
. Similarly,
were S to do not-A at t, then S would have done 0 at t' as
part of (3 . But again, that does not imply that the past -
m thls case 3' a doing 3 - would have been subtly different.
As with the stone, exactly one case of S' a doing 3 is involved,
and that exact same act is in both worlds. We need not deal
with two act tokens, or some such, one in each world. That if
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5 does A, 0 will have been done as a constituent of o< is
another instance of a logical glue-on.
If worlds are delineated by atomics, then presumably
segments of worlds are also, so we can take the trunx
section of each world- in a tree as being the set of atomics
evaluated true at times up to the time t where the forking
begins. But that worlds are parallel up to t simply
amounts to that they share all atomics evaluated true up to
t (as well as entailments of such). Thus all the worlds
within a tree have exactly one trunk section common to all.
That that trunk can be a part of distinct worlds does not,
again, imply that more than one trunk entity is being dealt
with. In each world, up to t, exactly the same entities do
exactly the same things at exactly the same time exactly at
the same places. We could, of course, talk about variations
m logical glue-ons, such as that the trunk is in fact actual
as part of o<
,
but that has no interesting consequences.
Thus there is exactly one trunk such that no matter which
of a number of worlds parallel to t is actual, that one trunk
is part of it, and if one of the other worlds were actual,
the self-same trunk would still be actual. Only the glue-ons
change, and they are not part of any world segment.
It might be objected that we're here playing fast and
loose with Leibniz Law, and that objection might be spelled out
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in the following manner
, suppose two worlds - „ and again -
share some trunk segment T. Suppose farther that „ and w'
differ in that at some point subsequent to the trunk, A occurs
in w and not in w>. But nothing can have both the property
of subsequently containing A and the property of not subse-
quently containing A. Thus there must be two separate trunk
segments involved
- one for each world.
The reply, of course, is that nothing in what has been
said implies that something does have both of the above-
named properties. The trunk does not contain either of the
complex properties 'subsequently containing A' or 'not sub-
sequently containing A ' . In one of the worlds the brunt seg-
ment is such that A is subsequently done in that world, and in
the other world the trunk is such that A is not subsequently
done in that world, but that need not be taken as implying
that the trunk segments are distinct unless e.g., that Jones
is in one world with bald Smith and in another world with
hirsute Smith implies that two Joneses are involved. Yet it
is not generally charged that any logical law has been vio-
lated in claiming that there is really only one Jones who is
in the two worlds. It seems reasonable, then, to claim that
the w trunk just is the w' trunk, and that the only interesting
difference in this case is in where things go after w and w'
diverge.
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So It is not the case that in (3 the trunk aeotion merely
parallels * , and that thus there is a difficulty about doing
things that would have as a consequence that we had always
been on a different - although parallel - route. There is
only one trunk, and no natter which of the worlds is actual,
we are in that trunk, and in the trunk segment of that world.
Any differences a.re in £cuin-*label u* *° x properties, which are merely
trivially entailed - via statements on the order of (ii) -
by what we do.
3o choices are what determine what path we take, and
thus what ultimately determine what world is actual. We are
not locked into any particular path - we can (logically)
choose to take whatever twists and turns within the tree we
want to. Within a tree, choices are effective in the way we
intuitively want; they do not pre-ordain the past in some
mysterious manner
- (ii) i a simply a necessary truth, and it
altera none of the bones of the past
- yet there is a clear
sense in which actuality rides on them. To go back to a
previous case, the actual world is an A-world if and only if
3 chooses to do A, i.e., the expedition passes along an A-
path if and only if s directs it into such a path at the
appropriate fork.
We can al9o talk about such a tree from the viewpoint of
a single agent. Suppose we construct a tree containing all and
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only possible courses of events which Involve some choice by
5, and call that s's original tree. Any path through this
tree will (up to the time that 3 ceases) be a possible life
for s.
But now, 0 + course, a complication arises. We have been
dealing with logically possible choices and paths, but obvious-
ly riot all such possible choices are choices really available
to 3 in every context. For instance, it is possible that
some actusl person S choose to fly to the warmer climate of
Mercury for the winter, but that is not an available choice
for 3 if s happens to have been born into the present context
in 1900 .
Thus we must/ distinguish between
(5^) 0 (3 choo ses (or does ) A
)
and (57) S can choose (or do) A
(the distinction is that between possibility vs. actually being
able)
.
In order to reflect that, we merely take S's original tree,
and prune from it all those branches which are not representat-
ive of available options for S, i.e., we remove from S's
original tree all paths representing possible lives that for
one reason or another s could not have lived.
There are many factors that operate to make various
possible lives unliveable. The fact that as humans we are
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born into Pre-exi a«n3 contorts eliminates many paths from the
collection of choices we have. Per instance, being born lnto
certain contexts blocks 3 from beino- a hi +cemg able to choose to fly to
Mercury for the winter. Phvsimi n* 1/81ca l law removes other paths -
none of us can choose to leap tall buildings in a single
bound. Shoices by Sod are also effective
- 3 >, choice to
climb the three peaks higher than Everest is done away with
because Sod chose not to create any such peaks. choices by
other agents figure in - S' s option to kick the tires on his
neighbor's car can be ruled out by his neighbor's choosing
not to buy a car, or by the local bandit's choosing to
remove the tires for purposes of his own.
It is at this point that subjunctives become relevant,
too. It is certainly possible that
(5^) 5 chooses to go to the local and meet S'
- 3 has within hie original tree the appropriate path. But
suppose that 3' has just found out that 3 is a rabid fan of
the hated (by s') Toledo Mudhens, and
(5-v ) Were 3 to go to the local, 3 ' would choose togo somewhere else
If (59) is true, the branch corresponding to ( 58 ) is removed
from the available tree for 3 .
:le Can 3ee that although we all have enormous original
trees, those trees are pared down drastically, once we become
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actual - i.e., once we
facts involved with the
join the expedition
- by contingent
pre-existing context which are beyond
our control.
Although trees have not been defined in full rigor
(they are, at this point, only intuitive excavation aids)
we can understand them sufficiently to enable us to charact-
enze sortie key locutions in terms of trees.
(^°) i^an_^^e_to
_bring about
g _A is true at t iff
there is a path from s' 8 positi^Tin
3 a available tree at t through an
A-point, and that path does not
involve a choice by any other agent
where an A-point is simply that point within the available
tree at which A is found
.
3_can choose to bring about,, A is true at t iff
there is a path from 3's position“in
S a available tree at t through an
A-point, and there is no part of
that path which involves a choice
by any other agent and which is not
sub junctively guaranteed.
The notion of a subjunctive guarantee is just an old friend
in fresh paint. Suppose that 3 wanted the chance to do 0, but
that that depended upon s' doing B. Were
(42) Were S to do A, S' would do B
true, then if A were within S’e sphere of influence, he could do
A and thus subjunctively guarantee himself the opportunity to do
r%
^ •
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(*5 )
(45)
brin fi about a ia true
— in S' savailable tree through an A-point
—
°Uld
* is true at tff there is a path from S' a position
.
S 8 callable tree at some time
Pr
^
r
J
t° 1 throu£h an A-point and thatpath does not involve a choice by
any other agent
5 could hav
e
chcaer. t° brln^ shoot. * ia true at tij_£ there is a path from s's positionin S s available tree at some time
prior to t through an A-point, and
there is no part of that path which
involves a choice by any other agent
and which is not subjunctively o-Uar _
(46)
frrfrr T? afn- t0 °h0O8e t0 brlne ahfmt - *t ue at t if there is a path from S's positionms s available tree at some time
prior to t through an A-point
It will be noticed that the above characterizations are not
in every respect parallel to the strong and weak notions of
bringing about' advanced by Plantings. The difference, however,
ia due entirely to the temporal indexing employed in the above,
and when that indexing is removed, as it will be later, the
differences collapse.
He must now ask how Flantinga's defense fits into the above,
and the answer seems to be 'smoothly'. To begin with, we must
notice that there is no particular available tree such that
were some possible person p made actual, he would have it.
Consider any available tree that p could have if made actual now,
and it can be seen to differ from any available tree that F
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night have had had he been born into the l 7 th century. The
-enable tree that anyone has depends upon contingent factors,
any of which might have been otherwise.
Second, we must see that God too, has His own available
fee, influenced by - among other things - human choices.
These two points, of course, are exactly what Plantinga
been trying to get us to see - that God must be within
the same structure that we are, and that tl*t structure can-
not be made large enough for all of us to exercise all 0 f 0ur
possible options within it.
The defense looks like this, if God ie going to be able
to choose to create a free perfect world w, there has to be a
path corresponding to that world in His available tree. But
any such path must involve the choices of other agents, so
aod could not have chosen to bring about
Q that world - (44).
but to bring it about
w
requires a subjunctive guarantee, and if
;/ere Bod to do T, w would result
is false, the subjunctive guarantee ie missing and Bod could not
bring about
w w - ( 45 ). In fact, if
(^o) were Bod to do T, w' would result
is true, not only is the subjunctive guarantee missing, there is
not even a path for w in God's available tree and thus of course
He could not have chosen to have taken that path.
And since the structure of any given tree is contingently
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God's tree could have been entirely ta#|dng ^
paths representing free perfect worlds, or there might have
been no subjunctive guarantees at all. *. oan lnterprel
omnipotence as having an available tree in which every path
such that it is consistent that the agent bring it about
.
8
contained in it. since it is consistent that God's
available tree be of that sort yet be devoid of free perfect
paths, the defense doe. not sacrifice omnipotence.
With the above apparatus, we can finally get all of
Plantings', responses on on. screen. On. objection was that
God should have created out of some other context, if the
context out of which He did create was such as to preclude
creation of a free perfect world. Plantings', response that
ood is as much in a world as we are can be translated to
mean that Ood, like all of ue, finds Himself, because of
uncontrollable contingencies involving a,song other things
free choices, with a certain available tree, and the structure
of that tree is something within which Ood must operate.
To demand that He have started with a different tree is no
more reasonable than telling someone who doesn't like his lot
in life that as long as he didn't arrange to be born into
different circumstances he has only himself to blame.
The other objection was that by placing Ood within a
world, intuitions concerning tho choices that were central to
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Plantinga's defense were lost Th« 4 .8t, ‘ e foregoing hopefully by-
passes that.
30 far, it looka as though trees provide us with the
sort of picture that Plahtinga is trying to draw. ». have
sod - like us - subject to a specific structure of actuality,
thus avoiding purported problems of where God starts from;
that structure allows an account of God's and our choices,
without getting us into certain intuitional difficulties;
and the structure allows for the incorporation of the sub-
junctives and contingencies upon which Plantinga's case is
ultimately based.
Now, however, two difficulties emerge - one minor, one
a bit trickier.
When Plantings insists that the subjunctives be eval-
uated relative to the actual world, that is his way of
making explicit that God is operating within some limited
context of actuality, just as we are. Although God must have
His own available tree, we do not know the structure of that
tree but we do know that <*'s path is in it, since the actual
result aod gets from creation must be represented within Hie
available tree, and i 8 the actual result of God's creating.
Plantings further wants to argue that it is possible that all
the subjunctives thtt he cites are true relative to of, and
that is simply plantinga's way of saying that it is possible
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that the available tree which 8od i 8 i„ faot faced ^ con.
tame no free perfect path. But the relevant factors deter-
mining which ordering is the crucial one are fixed by pre-
existing context, and whether or not the subjunctives in
question are true on- that 'real' ordering is a tatter of
necessity. Thus it may be that the tree which Sod in fact has
is not such that it is possibly devoid of free perfect
worlds. If it was possibly such, then it would be such and
we would have not merely a defense but a theodicy, and
rlantinga claims to be formulating only a defense. For all
we know it is possibly such, but that, of course, tells us
no more about its actual nature than the epistemic possibil-
ity of Ooldbach-s conjecture tells us about its mathematical
possibility.
But of course, it is consistent that God be faced with
such a tree - it is just that we can't put into it an arbi-
trary path, such as <* • 8
. And that u is con8iatent ifl ftU
that is needed for a defense.
So rather than claiming that it is possible that all the
relevant subjunctives be true in <*, it should be claimed
only that there is some world such that all the relevant
subjunctives are true relative to it. Of course, what
Plantinga said was that they were to be true 'in the actual
world'. Perhaps what he meant was that there was some world
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Wi “ "hiCh th°Se aUbj“"‘“’es ware true, and it was con-
a is tent that
^ have been actual. In any oaae
, whataver
problem there might have been i. easily fixed up.
The second difficulty is a bit more complicated.
Plantinga argues that if
W) Were Sod to do T, w would result
13 true, then no (t 4 -A) world is reachable, and that ifm is false, then no (T & A) world is reachable. That
begins to look not quite right.
Suppose, for example, that God's available tree con-
tains two branches splitting off from His T-fork - one in
which w results and one in which results. In that case
(50) <v (Were God to do T, w would result)
because were that subjunctive true, it would have ruled out
the path representing w’
,
and for a parallel reason
(51) «i (Were God to do T, w' would result)
But according to Plantinga, if (50) is true, w is simply
not to be gotten out of God's available tree; but it is there
because we just stipulated it there.
What God cannot do is subjunctively guarantee w, but it
does not follow from that that He cannot create and get free
perfect world w as a result. Yet Plantinga winds up with that
conclusion. To see what the difficulty is, we shall have to
examine his Principle 28.
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Principle 28 is "this;
(S ) (God can actualize s < t q n w° ^ 0)(CJod can actualize s &
(GO > 3)))
The principle sounds plausible. If an agent is able to
bring something about at all, there must be something totally
under his control such that his doing that thing triggers the
result in question, and if there is some such thing, then the
result is one he can bring about. If 0 entails s, then 5 is
strongly brought about. Otherwise, 3 is weakly brought about.
Nevertheless, P28 may not be adequate. Suppose that we
have a random number generator which works off the spontaneous
decay of some heavy element, so that there is no governing
non-etatistical law involved. That being the situation, there
are many worlds identical to this one up to some time t at
Which 3 pushes a button and the generator flashes a number of
its screen, since there is no governing non-statistical law,
3 may get a different number in every world and thus it might
reasonably be held that for any number n, it is not the case
that w.re 3 to push the button n would come up. But it does
not follow from that that 3 can't push the button and get a
seven. He can, if he's lucky, but he cannot guarantee it.
Now in God's available tree, there are three relevant
possible situations with respect to any path within that tree;
(i) no agent other than God is actively involved in that path
16
^
(e.g., (40))j
path segments
(il) agents other than Qod are Involved, but
involving the activities of such agents are
subjunctively guaranteed (e.g., ( 1,1 )); and (lu) agent8
other than 3od are involved and there are path segments
involving such agents not subjunctively guaranteed (e.g.,
(*5 )).
In thia last caee, there is nothing baring that path
from being travelled, and it will be if all the requisite
choices happen to be made. However, 3od cannot guarantee it,
as He can in either of the first two cases by either strongly
bringing it about, or by talcing advanta.ce of the appropriate
subjunctives. There seem, then, to be cases where there is
no operative subjunctive, where thus a particular result
cannot be guaranteed even within the bounds of the pre-
vailing situation, but within which the achievement of that
particular result is still not precluded, m those cases, it
will not follow from the falsity of the relevant subjunctive
that the desired result is unobtainable.
Thus, Plantings' s P28 seems to be adequate for the strong
and weak; cases, but there appears to be a still weaker one
which it does not cover. Happily for Plantings, that does not
matter. Notice that the only situations in which that weakest
sense of 'bring about' is appropriate are those in which there
is no relevant subjunctive, and as we've seen, in those cases
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th* atheolo61°al fails on epistemic grounds alone.
The upshot is this. Piantinga rests one side of his
defense on a clain, that if e.g., (49 ) is false, w is not
creatively reachable. W e reject that oUi. as a general
one, but conveniently, there is a related defense that
covers exactly those points which the retrenching of the
old defense exposes*
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CHAPTER V
It appears that we must grant Plantinga the consistency
of his intuitions, and that, in view of that consistency, hie
position withstands the attacks which it was designed to
withstand. However,
-we must do a bit of farther investigation
before we can conclude that we have been shown a viable de-
fense. The reason for that is that there is one attack
Which Plantings'
a position was not expressly designed to
repel because Plantings thought that it could be shown mis-
taken on other grounds entirely, and that is the Maxwell's
angel attack. As argued in chapter II, though, the proposed
counter to that thrust is not adequate, so we must now see
whether or not Plantinga's defense as a matter of fact sur-
vives it anyway, since considerations concerning that point
will be more easily seen within the ccntext of a formal state-
ment of Plantinga's defense, it is to that that we now turn.
Let I be a consistent set consisting of! simple prop-
ositions descriptive of Sod, statements' of logicallaw, and any other strictures Sod might be subjectO, it any. (in this latter category might be*
certain general natural laws, etc., which though
non-logical might be necessary#)
Let s be a member of the set S' of all sets of propositionsdescriptive of states of affairs that it is consist-
ent that God strongly actualize
Let O' be any consistent set of propositions descript-ive of contingent states of affairs not strongly
actualizable by God (and not contained in I
)
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0
for
JO is maximally consistent and such thatavery S there is at least one O' euch ttat ITl ?*,is maximally consistent U o U ^
Any such <1, S, 0'> is, of course, simply
. „0 rld.
Any such <1, s', 0> will be a cluster.
Let f be a selector function leading from each world to
zii’ »• i.
A world structure is any <1 , S i # Gf f > #
A mr
Vsl a °1U8ter ln a "°rld structurejust in case the components of that world are
contained within that cluster.
Clusters are the non-temporal parallel of God's available
tree. Every <S, O') constitutes what can be intuitively assoc-
iated with a branch of a tree. I f in a cluster there is some
3 such that there is exactly one O' such that <1, S , C »> is
a world, then were God to do S out of I, o' would result. If
there is some S such that there is more than one such O', then
God cannot know in advance what the result will be. Again,
God must work within the bounds of exactly one cluster, and
does not get to choose which. We do not know what the cluster
looks like except that f(<* ) is the cluster in question. In
general, everything that could formerly be said in terms of
trees can now be translated into non-temporal cluster terms.
For instance, if we decide that we must allow worlds to differ
only in subjunctives, we can account for the effect of that on
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God's creative abilities by simply allowing f to vary -
otherwise, we can claim that there is exactly one world struc-
ture, and hold f rigid.
Clusters, then, can be viewed as devices from which we
can read off what results - in each specific cluster
- Sod
can attain. God, being omnipotent, has available to Him in
every cluster all possible combinations of creative acts
performable (consistent with His performing them) - i. e
.,
all Ss - but if a result O' is not contained in the relevant
cluster, God cannot, within that cluster, achieve that
result. The crucial point, of course, is that it is con-
sistent to claim that God might have to deal from a cluster
in which the o component is lacking every O' which is a con-
stituent of a free perfect world, or a 0 component which is
such that there is no s such that there is a o' such that
<1, S, C'> is free perfect and such that there is no O'
such that <1, 3, o') is not free perfect.
Now let us see how the Maxwell's angel problem might be
handled. Let us consider a world a which though free is not
perfect - there are both good and evil choices made. The
suggestion is that the evil can be forestalled by temporarily
removing the freedom of any agent who otherwise is about to
go bad. What we must notice, however, is that if that freedom
is removed, the resulting world is not a - since in a there is
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evil, i.e., the agent freely does wrong. But ln that ca8e
must be two different maximal segments involved
- one
in which the agent is created free relative to the act, and
another (closely resembling the first) in which the agent is
not. The implied presumption behind the objection is that
Sod could (and should) actualize the second, thus getting a
perfect world, say b. Let us call b the maxwellization of
a and introduce a maxwellization operator, e
.g.,
( 1 ) b = M(a
)
Suppose, now, that in the cluster from which God is
actually working, a is available, i.e.,
(2) f(a) is the actual cluster
But then
(5) (w)(3od can bring about w —> w is in f(a))
i • 6 • i
(^) ( w ) ( God can bring about w —> f( w ) = f(a))
Now the response emerges. The objection i 8 that if a
contains evil, God could create a better free world by max-
wellizing a. But
(5) That God can create a implies that God can
create M(a)
is true only if
(6) f(a) = f(M(a))
and nothing concerning clusters guarantees that. In fact,
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were It true that were God to actualize the new maximal eo£.
»ent, b' (in which the agent goes bad relative to see other
aot) would result, then (6) is false. The objection rests
upon the assumption that if God can create some world a,
then there is a distinct perfect world b which has certain
special features in common with a and God can create b too.
That assumption is not one that has to be accepted, and in
order to escape it all we need do is point out that it is
consistent to maintain that there is a cluster within
which the maxwell ization of any world within that cluster
is absent. Plantinga's defense, then, provides for a re-
sponse to Maxwell's angel, since every response in the
literature has been defective in the manner discussed in
an earlier chapter, in this respect alone Plantinga's de-
fense represents a significant advance.
There is one other noteworthy consequence of Plantinga's
defense. Recall that earlier it was seen that one of the
hottest debates raged over whether or not the evils that
existed were justified in the loose sense that there were
counterbalancing goods that in some way depended upon their
existence. A common claim is that justified evil does not
militate against God's existence, but that unjustified evil
would, and that thus if there is unjustified evil, God does
not exist.
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If we take the usual intra-world interpretation of just-
ification, Plantings defense gives us a way of denying even
that. It is perfectly consistent that there be a cluster
containing no free world lacking unjustified evil, or no free
world lacking unjustified evil not sharing s with a world
containing unjustified evil, were such a cluster facing
3od, He would, If He were to create a free world, have to
create a world containing unjustified evil or have to gamble
risking creating such a world. Given the choices He would
have, His only moral obligation might be to create the best
of that bad lot in the first instance, or in the second
instance to not gamble and to create the best of those He
could guarantee, or to gamble and risk the odds on getting
the world with unjustified evil. In any of these cases. He
would have what we might call a transworld justification for
creating a world containing unjustified evil, since clusters
preserve His omnipotence - by virtue of containing all the
relevant Ss - and since the proposed case does not sacrifice
omniscience, the existence of the resulting unjustified evil
(if it did result) would indicate nothing of interest.
Thus whereas it has been generally presumed that the
theist is committed to denying the existence of unjustified
evil, Plantings has given the theiet a means for staking out
an even weaker, yet successful, position.
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To conclude, it appears that Plantings has presented us
with the first workable free will defense, that it is the first
capable of avoiding certain specific attacks, and that it
places on the theist a liehter oKugn obligation than might have
been expected.
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CONCLUDING
autobiographical
note
I have tried to ehow that although we can nibble around
the edges of Plantings' e defense, the core intuitions are
sound and can be modified promisingly.
However, the foregoing discussion has required the
aa sumption that
(l ) We cannot be to freely choose to do good
^ <l0
some'evil
° f frSed°" ^ lt8 producte justifies
are compatible (implying, of course, that each can be true).
While (ii) has drawn only eporadic attention
- possibly
becauae it is difficult to envision just how an argument on
the question might go
- (i) has a long and unsettled history.
The arguments for and against (i) have not been examined
here, but on this issue I aide with Plantings
- (i) seems true.
In fact, I believe that both (i) and (ii) are true. If the
foregoing chapters show that given (i) and (ii) a defense can
be made, then if my intuitions concerning (i) and (ii) are
reliable, the theist is in better shape than some have thought.
I am not going to here males any inferences employing that
last conditional, but it is perhaps fair to say that the theist
need not call his game on account of darkness just yet.
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APPENDIX I
1 .
2 .
3*
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
^ ^ A Assume
God can actualize
- Aesuce fcr reduotio
(3)(God can actualize S (3 o' )(Ood can etrongly
actualize O' & (go' > s)))
(3C')(God can strongly actualize O’ & (QC > w'))
GO' > w
'
(4)
^ ^ OT def of w' and T
30' > GT ( 5 ), (6)
(W
-»G0') v
~ 30') since ie maximal
(w- > ~ GO 1 ) —> (GO' —> ^ „•)
10 . ^ (GO' —> ro w' ) (5),
11 . (w> GC ) ( 8 ), (9)
12 . T O' Def of T
15. GT —> GO'
14. (GT = GT & GC' )
15. (GT 8c GO' ) > A (1). (14)
16 . GC > A (7), (15)
17. A —^ w' Def of w'
18. GO 1 > ~ w' (16), (17)
19. ru <> GO' (5), (18)
negation of (19) follows from the instantiation of (4),
But the
Thus
(20) /v/ (3 C')(God can strongly actualize O' & (GC > w' ))
Hence
(21) God cannot actualize w'
and the argument i. compete. Intuitively, It amount,
this: If (per stipulation) T is the maximum that God
to actualize w< and (since (GT > A)) that won't work,
nothing else will either.
to
can
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1 .
2 .
5*
4.
5 .
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10 .
11 .
12 .
15 *
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 .
21 .
APPENDIX ii
'''(GT > A)
God can actualize w
Assume
Assume for reductio
(S)(God can actualize 3 aa {3 C)(God can strongly
actualize C & (GO > s)))
G)(God can strongly actualize C & (GO > w)) (2), (5)
God can strongly actualize 0 & (GG > w) (A)
GO > w ( 5 )
((GO Sc GT) > w) v ((GO & rJ QT) > w)
(0 > w)
_> ( w 0 ) Def of 0 and
^ ( T * G) Def of w, 0,
( 6 )
w
and T
1 0
(6 ), (S), (9)
(T > 0) > (S(T 4 C) = GT ) since God can do 0
3T = 0(0 4 T) (10), (H)
~(0(T 4 0) > A) (1), ( 12 )
(0(T 4 0) > A) = (G(T 4 0) > (GT 4 A)) ( 12 )
((S(T 4 0) > (GT 4 A)) 5 (Q(T 4 0) > w) Def of w
assuming only one agent can
do A
~’(G(T Sc 0) > w) (i5 ), (14), ( 15 )
T —
>
0 (10)
T = 0 ( 17 ), (18)
GT > w ( 6 ), (19)
(GT > w) & ^(GT > w) (12), (16), (20)
137
22 .
24.
25.
26.
rJ (0 > T)
0 (0 & rj T)
( 17 ) - ( 21 )
( 22 )
Def of w and T
oJ T —^ ^ w
(0 & ~ T) T—> nJ
(Zk)
w (25)
2 ?* ((0 & ai w) — /v ((0 & ^T) > w)
23.
~(G(C 4 « T ) > w) (26), (27)
29. «(«(BU)>,) lw(a(0^t)><) (16)
50. ( (GO 4 AT ) > w) 4 ~ («SC 4 ~GT) > w)
but (50) la in contradiction of (7), thue
51 o Qod cannot actualize w
and the derivation is complete.
( 25 )
, (23)
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2 .
5 *
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6 .
appendix III
3 suffers TWD Assume
God can create w Assume for reductio. w is an
arbitrarily selected free flawless
world in which S is significantly
(S)(Ood can actualize S ^ (3 0)(3cd can etrcngly
actualize 0 & (GO > s)))
sod can create w ( 3 0 )(8od can etrcngly actualize
C & (GO > w)) (^)
( 3 C)(G°d can strongly actualize G & (GO > w)) (4), ( 2 )
GO > w ( 5 )
Let us concede that the state of affairs 0 is just that state
of affairs T in conjunct ( 1 ) of the definition of TWD.
(3A)(GC > S goes wrong with respect to A) (1), TWD
GO > S goes wrong with respect to A
( 7 )
S goes wrong with respect to A —> ro w Def of w
GO > ru w ( 8 ), ( 9 )
~ O GC (6), (10)
rJ
( God can strongly actualize 0 ) ( 11 )
and if God cannot actualize 0, then He cannot create w.
8 .
9.
10 .
11 .
12 .

